This chapter provides the historical background necessary to understand the book’s empirical analysis. It discusses the political decisions that led to the displacement of Germans and Poles at the end of WWII and challenges the assumption that uprooted communities were internally homogeneous. It then zooms in on the process of uprooting and resettlement and introduces data on the size and heterogeneity of the migrant population in postwar Poland and West Germany.

Chapter Four focuses on US compliance with international law. The perception of former officials was that US compliance with international law was robust. When asked about the reasons that the United States complies or does not comply with international law, the former officials’ responses tracked many of the factors they listed for states in general. The chapter then explores the interplay between law and policy, exploring how policymakers balance these competing concerns. Former officials were clear that while international law was generally followed, it was not always dispositive. Legal issues were considered as one factor among a variety of factors, essentially involving a cost–benefit analysis. The salient considerations driving compliance or noncompliance, as revealed in the interviews, appeared to be the nature of the national interest or policy at stake; the nature and significance of the international legal rule involved ethical considerations; the views of allies; the ambiguity or precision of the legal obligation; and the weight of domestic political and bureaucratic concerns. The chapter next examines factors that may affect policymaker perceptions, including party affiliation, and concludes with a description of instances where the United States either bent international law or complied scrupulously.

What makes diplomatic negotiation different from other negotiations is that it takes place between or among nation-states through their representatives, and the stakes are usually higher than those in a domestic context. In addition, while other types of negotiation tend to be mostly transactional, negotiating in diplomacy cannot be isolated from the overall relationship with the other party. A truly successful diplomatic negotiation is one that not only resolves an immediate problem, but ensures that the state of relations with the other side will serve one’s interests in the long run. That does not mean that ties must necessarily be close or friendly, as long as they are civil and respectful, and the countries can work together in the future. Another feature of negotiation that is essential in diplomacy is its ability to build a basis for empathy. It helps to convey one’s own motivations and interests directly, which can reduce misunderstanding, and it provides insight into the other side’s motivations and perceptions.

This chapter focuses on the experience of Hong Kong refugees in Macau. It addresses the role the British consulate in Macau played in refugee management and intelligence networks, explaining how the enclave was an important base and a connecting node for British operations. This chapter argues that Macau played an important supportive role to many in and from Hong Kong from late 1941 to the end of the war. It allowed for escapees to reach unoccupied China, for a great number of refugees to receive assistance, for intelligence to be gathered and for resistance activities to be coordinated. The chapter highlights the significant experience of colonial transplantation that allowed the British to keep a foothold in South China and facilitated the reoccupation of Hong Kong.

Chapter 7 discusses how trust can emerge in the general citizenry. Engaging with Danielle Allen’s iteration of “political friendship” and its critics, this chapter argues that a division of labour between the practices of “talking” and “shouting back” among the underprivileged, the oppressed, and their allies can counteract the social domination problem. Shouting back (aggressive civic disruption) makes it harder for the privileged and the dominant to claim ignorance about the persistence of injustices, while talking can promote trust between the underprivileged, the oppressed, and their allies on the one hand and “unwitting oppressors” and “softer complicit oppressors” on the other hand. Distinguishing among forms of talking, this chapter shows that the practice and revision of good manners should be the primary vehicle to cultivate trust. In addition, this chapter argues that allies should strive to “listen well” – to afford the underprivileged and the oppressed a sense of recognition when such recognition is all too rare, and to discourage unwitting oppressors and softer complicit oppressors from aligning politically with “harder complicit oppressors” and “proud oppressors.”

Chapter 5 shifts to the island colony of Singapore, where Australia’s Eighth AMF Division defended the island alongside British and local forces and volunteers in the weeks before its capitulation, suffering greatly as Japanese captives. The chapter describes the dispersal of camps at the fall of Singapore, following the fate of Australian and other Allied soldiers across an emergent camp geography. Its main aim is envisioning the entirety of the island as converted to an encampment through the distribution of Allied camps, including the dispersal of work camps in requisitioned domestic and institutional facilities, exploring how wartime defense and capitulation provided structures for contemporary citizenship.

In the Mekong Delta, in addition to directly fighting against the communist-led Resistance, the French also allied with semi-autonomous militias against the Resistance, particularly those associated with the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. A situational logic of alliance and opposition, understood by all participants, shaped the overarching "system." Within this system, both the French and the Resistance competed to co-opt smaller groups, from parastates to local militias, to their side, which in turn tried to establish their autonomy. This chapter looks at these allies, some of which were parastates, their funding, their economic bases, and their interactions. It gives particular attention to those affiliated with the Cao Dai (Pham Cong Tac, Trinh Minh The) and the Hoa Hao militias (Tran Van Soai, Ba Cut). It also examines the complexity of control at local levels, where in some villages, up to three different political actors, including the Vietnamese state, vied for dominance.

This chapter is the first of four chapters focused on the penteteric or Great Panathenaia, which took place every four years. It looks at how individuals participated in the procession, which conveyed the sacrificial animals, the peplos and other offerings to the Akropolis, and the sacrifices to Athena. The procession and attendant rituals included a multitude of different roles for various individuals and groups: Athenians, both male and female, were certainly represented, but so were other inhabitants, the metics and their daughters and delegations from the colonies and, in the later fifth century BC, the allies. Together, they made up the community of ‘all the Athenians’, who were celebrating the goddess and her deed against the Giants. These rituals repeated the festival’s stories and themes, which unified the rituals and linked them to the games.

This chapter focuses on the identities created for other residents (Athenian women and girls, male metics and their daughters and Athenian boys, beardless youths and ephebes) and non-residents (especially colonies and allies). In comparison to those of the male Athenians, the identities of other residents and non-residents of the city were not nearly as complex, in part because these other groups had limited opportunities for participation in the celebration. While the identities of Athenian boys, beardless youths and ephebes focused on their position as citizens-to-be or as the newest citizens who were prepared to fight for the city, the identities for the other groups focused on their service to the goddess. The participation of both non-residents and residents also marked them as members of the community of “all the Athenians” and allowed them to create identities as members of this group. International visitors had a significant role to play as excluded non-members who contrasted with members of the community. Thus, how one took part in the Great Panathenaia was instrumental in determining what it meant to be a member of “all the Athenians” who were celebrating the Great Panathenaia.

Britain and Italy were allied, at last. The London Treaty proved a diplomatic score and a double-edge sword for both.

Chapter 5 explores the politics and practices of Allied relief, which were characterised by continuous tensions between military strategies and humanitarian concerns. The British War Cabinet openly prioritised maintenance of the economic blockade, deferring all civilian relief until after the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany. Eventually, the Allies and Germans agreed to allow limited relief supplies from neutral resources but only under conditions that would not upset military operations for either side. Throughout the crisis, political and military considerations determined the parameters of food relief. Due to the lengthy and detailed negotiation process, the main impact of the Allied contribution to famine relief took place only after hostilities had ended.

The final chapter opens with a discussion of the transformed nature of the war in the Mediterranean after the Axis surrender in Tunisia, where Axis maritime commitments had shrunk, yet remained substantial. The Allied focus on other in-theatre tasks, particularly the invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy, pushed anti-shipping operations into a side-line role. Yet there were times when they received greater focus, including the Axis evacuation of Sicily, and in the Aegean during 1943–44. An account of anti-shipping operations over the period in question shows that there were in fact very high quantities of sinkings at certain stages of the period in question. These contributed yet further to the overall shipping crisis, forcing the Axis to expedite the withdrawal from Sardinia, Corsica and many of their Aegean possessions. By late 1944, most of the territories reliant on maritime supply had been abandoned, and the anti-shipping campaign had been a key element in ensuring Allied victory in the Mediterranean.

While El Alamein represented an important defensive victory at the eastern fringe of the Mediterranean, joint Anglo-American landings in north-west Africa caused a transformation of the theatre. This shift to a truly Allied venture, where the war in North Africa was fought on two fronts, had consequent effects on Axis supply requirements. Anti-shipping operations continued to receive high priority throughout this period, resulting in a devastating 477 vessels of over 700,000 tons being sunk in five months. This ensured that the minimum level of supplies required by the Axis forces were not received. In fact, the losses were so devastating that the Axis came to lack the necessary shipping to even attempt shipping the required amounts in the first place. The chapter then offers a revolutionary new argument: that the period around October 1942 represented a tipping point towards collapse for the Axis position in the wider Mediterranean. The consistently high rates of sinkings had greatly eroded the base of available tonnage, and efforts to improve construction had failed. The attempts to fill the void with seized French tonnage were inadequate, and by early summer 1943 the Axis were acknowledging that maintaining positions such as Sardinia and Corsica was no longer possible, while retaining the Aegean islands and even Sicily were tenuous aims.

In this chapter, we examine the issue of allies for sale. In an effort to curry favor with influential outsiders, domestic candidates change their policy positions. If a superpower enjoys hegemony in a country, and local parties have weak programmatic roots, the result are more pliant allies. Competition from other powers changes the picture. Platforms shift less, with the power with greater willingness to invest more benefiting from a net policy move in its direction. It is important to note that it takes parties that care to a different degree for their programmatic bases (paying different costs for deviating from their ideal point) for political polarization in target states to actually increase under external pressure. In such cases, interventions become costly for outsiders: they benefit from the increased polarization and so pay up.The empirical cases of Brazil and Italy both show cases of growing polarization and high costs for the United States, competing against Communist parties and sympathizers. In one case, the right candidates kept winning, in the other, they narrowly lost. Faced with a similar scenario of outside interests in its elections, Finland exhibited a different dynamic. Due to the strong programmatic bases of its parties, superpowers saw little platform change in the Finnish case. This helped motivate them to get out of Finnish politics.