Khomeini’s arguments were foundational to the Islamic Republic. The significance of his jurisprudential contributions and innovations cannot be overstated. For the first time, he theorized about direct rule by a faqih. He revolutionized the position of velayat-e faqih by taking it out of the social and cultural realms only and planting it firmly in the domain of politics. First, he made the velayat-e faqih a political supervisor, then a ruler, and finally an absolute ruler. Khomeini gave the absolute ruler the authority to issue injunctions that superseded the injunctions of religion if necessary and empowered him to decide on what was expedient and in the interest of the greater good. These ideas continue to remain foundational to the Islamic Republic. Today, Khomeini the ruler has been all but forgotten. His portraits continue to adorn government buildings, his mausoleum is a frequent stop for visiting dignitaries, and his legacy is duly praised on official occasions and in state ceremonies. But the state has long moved on from what one scholar aptly called “Khomeinism.” From the 1990s on, it has been “Khameneism” that has ruled Iran politically and jurisprudentially, with its own conceptions of velayat-e faqih.

This chapter focuses on the arguments of precisely the kind of individual described by Kadivar. More specifically, within the intellectual reformist current described in the previous chapter, the arguments of a number of particular figures associated with it deserve more in-depth treatment. These individuals took the hermeneutics movement started by Soroush one step further by theorizing about Islamic democracy. They made explicit one of the key dimensions that is implicit in the hermeneutics movement, namely that, interpreted correctly, there is deep theoretical and structural consistency between Islam and democracy. As with their intellectual predecessors, this new crop of scholars start with the assumption that religious teachings are powerfully influenced by social conditions. Many religious rules came about to address specific social conditions that existed at a particular time and place, they argue, and therefore may not apply at other times. By the same token, understanding the teachings of religion and acquiring religious knowledge also depend on prevailing conditions.