This chapter looks at how the government should be held accountable for the purpose of the ideal accountability benchmark. This requires attention both to the procedures by which accountability is delivered (eg the nature of the accountability forum and how it performs its role) as well as the ultimate consequences of the accountability process (eg sanctions and remedies). This chapter explores these two ideas, asking what processes and consequences might be most relevant for the purpose of each of the various accountability rationales. For example, if the goal is to punish wrongdoing, it might be appropriate to apply highly punitive sanctions tempered by procedures with built-in protection such as a high burden of proof. On the other hand, if the goal is to ensure redress for those who suffer harm as a consequence of government wrongdoing, it might be more appropriate to apply restorative remedies via victim-friendly procedures. In order to design an accountability benchmark that can be used to identify accountability deficits and overloads, it is necessary to consider the most suitable means to achieve whatever ends we assign to the overarching concept of accountability.

This chapter explores the complex question of for what an agent should be held accountable for the purpose of defining the ideal accountability benchmark. Given the breadth of this question, this chapter focuses on two of the 'building blocks' that might be relevant in defining the standards of conduct against which government performance might be measured: fault and outcomes. Even at this level of abstraction, the task of establishing an accountability benchmark is a difficult one, with each accountability rationale suggesting a different approach. For instance, if our goal is punishment we might think it appropriate to limit accountability to cases of intentional wrongdoing. On the other hand, if our goal is redress we might be more concerned with the outcomes of an official's actions rather than their intentions. In order to define a benchmark, it would be necessary to engage with difficult philosophical questions about when it is appropriate to hold another person accountable for their actions, and the inherent complexity of this task might be one explanation for the lack of detailed consideration of these ideas in the existing literature.

This chapter explores two key difficulties encountered in deciding to whom an agent should be accountable for the purpose of an ideal accountability benchmark. First, there are a multiplicity of factors that might influence a prosecutor’s capacity and interest to undertake that role (eg resources, skills and motives). Secondly, we will likely reach differing views on the best choice of prosecutor depending on which accountability rationale we are interested in promoting. So, for instance, if our goal is punishment of wrongdoing we might think it appropriate that this is managed by a state prosecutor to reinforce the seriousness of a transgression. On the other hand, if our goal is to control public power we might think it appropriate to have a very open regime in order to maximise the likelihood that a prosecutor will volunteer for the task. It would be necessary to confront and resolve these difficult questions in order to define a benchmark of accountability.

This chapter looks at the various choices that must be made in deciding who should be held accountable pursuant to an accountability mechanism. Some of the key difficulties discussed include the sheer size and complexity of modern government, particularly in a federal system; that government operations are increasingly performed via co-operation between different entities and individuals, making it difficult to pinpoint a ‘wrongdoer’; the increasing trend of privatisation and outsourcing; and underlying philosophical questions about our conception of government, including whether it should be treated as a corporate entity or a collection of individuals. Once those difficulties have been confronted, it is then necessary to make choices about what approach best suits the selected rationale(s) for accountability. For instance, the desert rationale might favour holding individual wrongdoers directly accountable, whereas the redress rationale might favour holding the government accountable as an entity on the basis that it is in a better position to provide an appropriate remedy.