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Chapter 3 focuses on the figure of the jihadist in the context of the Syrian Civil War. Outlawed as a terrorist by the Security Council and perceived as a security threat in home states, this latest version of the enemy of humanity seems to have nothing in common with previous foreign fighters. The aim of the chapter is to re-inscribe this actor within the longer history of foreign volunteering. It shifts from domestic debates to national courtrooms, showing how the jihadist combatant gets constantly split in two: idealist and fanatic, hero and villain, martyr and freedom fighter. Based on previous images of the foreign fighter, these dichotomies highlight different conceptions of freedom and hence problematize its current conflation with terrorism. The chapter ends with a digression on the laws of war, revealing the persisting cultural bias used against certain foreign combatants through the domestic application of IHL.
The civil war, and later the rise of ISIS, left Syrian Kurds with an unprecedented opportunity to control their areas in north and north-eastern Syria. As Kurdish forces – the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which went on to form the main plank of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – showed their effectiveness in fighting ISIS, international support for their efforts in combatting terrorism grew, particularly from the United States. The SDF came to control Syria’s Kurdish areas, as well as a portion of the non-Kurdish areas, including the heartland of ISIS’s self-proclaimed caliphate in northwest Syria. By 2017, Syrian Kurds, through their dominance of the SDF, effectively controlled more than one-quarter of Syria’s territory, the second-largest region after the government-controlled areas of Syria. For areas which fell within Rojava – Syrian Kurdistan – Syria’s Kurds are agitating not for independence but rather for greater self-rule and stronger local governance. However, political fragmentation within the Syrian Kurdish community and their respective regional and political patrons may undermine their chance for autonomy. This chapter examines the state of the Kurds in Syria, while providing a historical perspective and an assessment of possible post-war scenarios.
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