This chapter accounts for the twists and turns of Soviet–American and Sino-Soviet relations in 1960–61. Khrushchev's primary concern was resolving the Berlin issue, and he hoped that the new US president, John F. Kennedy, would be more amenable to finding a solution than Eisenhower had been. China continued to be a problem for Khrushchev. During the November 1960 Moscow conference of Communist parties, he faced Chinese resistance and criticism but ultimately prevailed in having the conference adopt a declaration that largely ignored Beijing's objections. After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the Soviet leader became increasingly concerned with the prospect of Cuba's survival. Berlin, Cuba, and other global issues were at the center of his discussions with Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961. The summit ended on a sour note, but despite Khrushchev's bluster and his optimistic evaluation that the chances of a war with the United States stood at merely 5 percent, he proved unwilling to push his luck over Berlin and ultimately authorized the building of the Berlin Wall to stem the flow of refugees and stabilize a highly volatile situation in East Germany.

The socialist movement had two worldviews, monist materialism a la Ludwig Büchner and dialectical materialism a la Karl Marx. This chapter examines how party leaders and secularist intellectuals theorized the relationship of the two and then looks at the role of popular science in party educational policy. It then moves from the theoretical and policy level to an investigation of the intellectual world of rank-and-file socialists. It opens up new perspectives to explain the well-established fact that workers more happily read works of scientific materialism than the works of Kautsky or Marx. Autobiographical texts are examined to understand why conversion experiences were usually tied to the acceptance of scientific rather than historical materialism. It introduces the role of secularism in the biographies of important socialist leaders, such as Walter Ulbricht, the future leader of the GDR (1949-71). Based on the growing realization that many social groups organized in socialism were attracted to secularist worldview, the chapter will also look at the women’s movement inside the SPD and its particular take on monism.

This chapter examines Brecht’s complicated relationship with the German Democratic Republic and its leaders.In 1948, after the end of World War II, Brecht returned to Germany and ultimately settled in East Berlin in the GDR, where he became the artistic leader of the famous Berliner Ensemble, the most influential postwar theater group in the world. However, because of his revolutionary approach to drama and aesthetics, Brecht quickly ran into conflict with East German leaders and had to endure a series of criticisms and accusations against himself and his artistic collaborators. Brecht also sought to democratize and liberalize the artistic and cultural sphere of the GDR. Ultimately, Brecht’s relationship with socialist leaders in the GDR represented a push-pull and give-and-take. Each side had to compromise, and each side received something in return. Brecht received his own theater and the ability to perform plays as he wished, while the leaders of the GDR were able to bathe in the glory of Brecht’s international artistic success.