Chapter 3 reconstruct how the (collective) emotions, the political and economic practices, and the geopolitical and societal circumstances of the war times guided Western Europe to a path of deeper international and regional cooperation focused on free trade and valuta convertibility. During exile and occupation, European governments fleshed out plans and schemes for post-war cooperation, primordially in the domains of socio-economic and the financial-economic planning, in greater (practical) detail. These exercises were emotionally charged and driven by the lessons of the war against the Nazis and the post-war period after the First World War—a learning from history in which the churches played a leading role and co-prepared the political ground for the popularity of a new and hugely influential conservative political family in Western Europe: Christian Democracy.

In French colonial history, we can read the world wars as a single conflict. The Great War and World War II broke the French empire as it existed in the previous century. The empire contributed substantially in blood and treasure to victory in 1918, though mobilization for that war deepened existing colonial tensions and created new ones. Shifting dynamics pointed to a renegotiation of basic colonial bargains. An ostensibly new colonial doctrine, the mise en valeur, sought to make the empire a more cohesive economic and political unit. Anti-colonial movements became stronger and more articulate throughout the interwar period, though repression and military force had little trouble preserving imperial authority, for the time being. The defeat of 1940 upended imperial relationships. How could the Vichy regime rule an empire when it had very limited authority even in the Hexagon? Yet Free France promised only continued, if reformed, imperial rule. This situation made questions of collaboration and resistance at least as complicated in the empire as in Europe. By 1945, it became clear to the attentive that the French empire would either have to expire or become something else.

The final phase of Vichy’s dealings with Rome brought the sharpest divergence in its relations with the two Axis governments. The full occupation of France ended the last vestiges of French sovereignty. However, the power relationship between Vichy and Rome evolved very differently to that between Vichy and Berlin. Vichy’s negotiations between the conflicting demands of the German and Italian authorities were, characterised by opportunism, not fully appreciated when focusing exclusively on the German occupation. Whereas Vichy chose to work with Rome to offset Berlin’s demands on the Service du Travail Obligatoire, it resolutely chose collaboration with Berlin over the opportunities afforded by Rome when it came to the treatment of Jews. Vichy’s willing collaboration with Nazi anti-Semitic policies saw it oppose the Italian attempts to prevent the deportation of Jews in their occupation zone. The fall of Mussolini ended the prospect of any fruitful cooperation with Italy. With growing internal pressure from French collaborationist forces to engage in a more radical and ideological form of collaboration, Vichy’s alignment with Nazi Germany finally became definitive.

The conclusion ties together the book’s argument, linking diplomatic relations to local-level negotiations and ideological dimensions to demonstrate how Vichy’s engagement with the Axis saw it caught in a double bind. It reflects on the absence of public memories of the Italian occupation and the tendency to focus on Germany in the scholarship. This chapter also highlights how French responses to the challenges arising out of the Italian armistice terms, Fascist territorial claims and the Italian occupation were critical to shaping Vichy’s wider policies on collaboration. The Italian dimension to Vichy’s actions, therefore, necessitates a reconceptualisation of state collaboration and its relationship to collaborationism as well as the relationship between collaboration and resistance.

The cases in this section involve countries whose governments and/or senior administrators remained at least initially in place under Axis hegemony, establishing a potential institutional locus for the definition and dissemination – or alienation – of patriotic attitudes and values under the circumstances of occupation. Particularly during the early period after military defeat, these leaders were left with at least some limited measure of autonomy in their interactions with the occupiers as well as in their relationship with their own citizenry. What choices did they make under those circumstances, to what extent and in what ways did they seek to legitimize them in patriotic terms, and to what degree did their publics appear to accept or reject such justifications?

This chapter depicts France on the eve of Liberation as various factions jockeyed for legitimacy and rightful claim to lead France once Paris was free again. It reveals a debate within US government circles about the accuracy of the entrenched image of France at the onset of the Cold War as decadent and teetering toward revolution. In exchanges with the White House, State Department and military intelligence, right-leaning French sources, including familiar military, intelligence, political and industrial figures, bolstered this view. French contacts in the Resistance meanwhile shaped Office of Strategic Services analysis that France was a strong, worthy ally. Thus France became a contested idea with warring factions in both capitals, as well as the far reaches of the French empire, seeking to influence US policy.

This chapter explores how the Germans judged the effectiveness of the ‘Jewish Councils’ in Western Europe throughout the course of the war. Throughout the occupation, the German (and Vichy) departments involved in Jewish affairs increasingly wanted to consolidate their control over the Jewish bodies, either to gain more power at the cost of their rival institutions or to speed up the process of anti-Jewish legislation and persecution. This is important for our understanding of the ways in which these organisations interacted with their German (or Vichy) overseers – including the SiPo-SD, the Commissariat Général aux Questions Juives (in France), the Military Administration (in Belgium and France) and the Civil Administration (in the Netherlands) – and sheds light on the broader dynamics of occupation in each of the three countries. The chapter demonstrates that whereas the Germans were reasonably satisfied with the organisational effectiveness of the Dutch Jewish Council, they took issue with how its Belgian and French counterparts functioned. It is argued that this difference is primarily caused by (limited) cooperation of individual leaders, the (lack of) leaders’ absolute power and the existence of powerful alternative representations in Belgium and France.

This chapter deals with the establishment histories of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud (the ‘Jewish Councils’ in Western Europe) in 1941. It shows that German officials improvised and copied blueprints from elsewhere, and that rivalry between the various German institutions involved in Jewish affairs affected the form and function of these organisations in Western Europe. It furthermore demonstrates that various German institutions interpreted the exact remit of each of the Jewish organisations differently. As a result, the Jewish organisations in Western Europe were all organised in different ways and all functioned differently, despite the strong German desire to unify anti-Jewish policies. The chapter furthermore examines the impact of the rivalry between the various German institutions on the Jewish organisations, arguing that the increasing influence of the SiPo-SD in the Netherlands, together with an overlap of functions, resulted in a rapid succession of anti-Jewish measures in this country. In Belgium and France, by contrast, institutional rivalry not only hampered the establishment of the AJB and the UGIF, but it also resulted in postponements and, from the German perspective, in a looser grip on the Jewish organisations.

The armistice logic combined a short war, Britain’s rapid capitulation, and the quick conclusion of a Franco-Axis peace to liberate French POWs. “L’homme providentiel,” Pétain, was embraced as “a substitute for politics and a barrier to revolution.” The Armistice transferred responsibility for defeat to the Republic and its combat-shy “citizen soldiers,” liberated the professional army from the tyranny of the levée, and transformed surrender into a collective rather than individual act. Vichy wagered that collaboration would place France in a position to play a major role in Hitler’s New Europe. The three departments that comprised Alsace-Moselle were incorporated into the Reich. But it also sealed the status of France as a second-tier power. Despite the armistice and the fact that many French soldiers remained incarcerated in Germany, France retained considerable latent military power, that included a 100,000-man Armistice Army, roughly the same number in French North Africa, a considerable air force sans avions, and a significant navy. However, rather than prepare clandestinely for la revanche as many of its supporters believed, Vichy’s energies were directed into collaboration. A paramilitary Chantiers de la Jeunesse, designed to build the character so lacking in French youth, was stood up, as well as various organizations like the LVF that provided a vehicle for recruiting Frenchmen to serve in German forces. The armistice, not the British attack at Mers-el-Kébir, took Vichy and its navy down the path of collaboration.

This chapter explores the future of the French fleet in the wake of the Franco-German armistice. It focuses upon the fleet’s material and symbolic importance on both sides of the Channel. For Pétain’s newly minted government, the fleet was a mark of international prestige, a measurement of sovereignty and the guardian of the empire. For Britain, it was a strategic and symbolic liability. Its neutralisation would send a powerful message of Britain’s wartime resolve to audiences in Britain, metropolitan France and the United States.

Operation Catapult was conceived to remove the French fleet as a military threat, illustrate British power and justify an armed incursion against an erstwhile ally. By examining the content and proposed timing of draft press releases, which have not been discussed in any academic literature to date, this chapter reveals how policy-makers dealt with questions of violence and morality in wartime. It explores how these normative concepts precluded certain actions while allowing others. Finally, it assesses how British leaders justified action against the French fleet as both inevitable and necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.

The bombardments at Mers el-Kébir highlighted the tensions between Britain and metropolitan France. Two months later, Operation Menace aimed to bring Senegal into the Free French colonial sphere. Heavy resistance from forces loyal to Vichy derailed British-Gaullist plans. The operation was abandoned on 25 September 1940.

This chapter presents the complex triangular relationship between Britain, Vichy and the Free French. At the forefront was the contradiction between British desires to foster Anglophilia within metropolitan France and its willingness to intercede violently in Vichy colonial territory. Its solution was to frame the operations as entirely French, in both conception and leadership. Official descriptions and justifications of Operation Menace argued that the beleaguered population within Senegal demanded to be allied with the Free French movement.

The British-Free French failure to capture Dakar highlighted the relative weakness of de Gaulle’s movement. Public and media criticism in the British metropole and the United States favoured military victory over altruistic claims that the operation had been abandoned to ‘avoid a fight amongst Frenchmen.’ At the same time, the Dakar operations fostered tensions between British officials and de Gaulle, which contradicted public declarations of cooperation. These would become increasingly difficult to resolve in the following years.