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1 results

  • 20 - Vertical Merger Policy

  • from Part V - Mergers and Acquisitions
  • Roger D. Blair, University of Florida, Christine Piette Durrance, Tirza J. Angerhofer, Duke University, North Carolina
  • Book:
    Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
    Published online:
    24 November 2022
    Print publication:
    08 December 2022, pp 457-478

  • Summary

    Neither vertical mergers nor mergers of complementary input suppliers alter the structure of either the upstream or downstream market. As a result, assessing their competitive significance is more complicated and more subtle than assessing the competitive significance of a horizontal merger. In this chapter, we will tease out the competitive concerns that have shaped vertical merger policy. We discuss vertical mergers in the biotechnology industry, in managed care, and between physician groups and hospitals to illustrate the difficult evaluation task assigned to the Agencies.