Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

1 results

  • 19 - Values

  • from Part III - Media and Modes of Ethical Practice
  • Edited by James Laidlaw, University of Cambridge
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook for the Anthropology of Ethics
    Published online:
    11 May 2023
    Print publication:
    25 May 2023, pp 485-507

  • Summary

    Anthropologists of ethics have often drawn inspiration from ancient virtue ethics and ordinary language philosophy. What might be gained for the study of ethics by drawing on a theory of values? This chapter shows that value theory, in allowing us to distinguish between moral and non-moral values, offers two ways of conceptualizing ethics. Narrowly conceived, ethics is about people’s efforts to realize moral values, hence to relate to other people in the right way. Broadly conceived, ethics is also about people’s efforts to relate in appropriate ways to the variety of values they recognize, including aesthetic and epistemic ones. Employed on their own or in combination, the narrow and the broad conceptions are uniquely suited for a systematic comparison of ethical life across a diverse range of societies. A comparative discussion of cases from Africa and Euro-America shows that while the content and relative weight given to moral values vary significantly, valuing things appropriately is always an ethical matter.