The present chapter has a two-fold aim. First, it maps the current state of international supervision in the area of international criminal law by looking particularly at the competence of treaty bodies and other non-compliance mechanisms (NCMs), their institutional and operative differences, progressive sophistication, and other developments in recent practice. Secondly, the chapter investigates the features of, and circumstances under which, NCMs established by specific international criminal law instruments are more effective than others in addressing situations of non-compliance and orientating the future actions of States.

This chapter looks at reciprocity in the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, and the differences in the role reciprocity plays in inter-State dispute settlement, and in dispute settlement procedures that involve non-State entities such as individuals. It looks at the well-developed role that reciprocity plays in the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, before turning to the system of compulsory dispute settlement in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The chapter then analyzes three types of instance which concern individuals: the International Criminal Court; human rights courts and complaint mechanisms; and investment tribunals, specifically the issue of the extension of jurisdiction on the basis of an MFN clause.

The introductory chapter presents the argument of the book, that transnational lawmakingcoalitions exist beneath the surface of the UN human rights treaty bodies’ formal actors, rules, and processes. TLCs shed light on the particularities of the treaty interpretation process and provide an analytical lens to understanding the key role expert bodies and issue professionals play in the development of human rights law. The chapter situates the book in the relevant literatures and outlines its research methods and structure.

Chapter 6 addresses the absence of the state from the procedures described throughout the book with a forward-looking eye on the TLC and the present status of the human rights regime. On the TLC, this chapter advances the argument such coalitions are in no way to be seen as a mode of international lawmaking without governments, as states, in their status as the treaty body system’s ultimate arbiters, have ample opportunities to mold the system to their liking – by way of, for example, elections, ratifications, budget, willingness to participate in the procedures, and compliance with their obligations. Indeed the Treaty Body Reform 2020 initiative reflects their awareness of autonomy of the treaty bodies themselves. With it likely that states cannot enact this reformation while also maintaining presence in the human rights regime, it will be crucial to see how this conflict plays out in the future.

As the very concept of TLCs rests on this notion of their being a lawmaking coalition through treaty interpretations, the General Comments (GC), the chapter introduces the UN human rights treaty bodies and gives data on their decision-making rules, their membership, workload, and on the instrument of interest for this book, the GCs. This chapter explains what GCs are, the degree to which the UN treaty bodies use GCs in different functions, and how state parties and scholars understand – and contest – GCs’ legal substance. Moving beyond notions of formal authority, the chapter argues for GCs’ authoritativeness because they serve as necessary reference points to human rights, especially because a broader community (NGOs, domestic courts, specialized agencies) enacts them in the realms of domestic law, politics, and civil society. Ultimately, what this chapter makes eminently apparent is that general comments’ authoritativeness depends less on state recognition and more on the multitude of actors breathing life into their interpretations.

Chapter 5 delves into three additional cases of treaty interpretation by the human rights treaty bodies. The aim of the chapter is to probe the plausibility of the TLC concept across the human rights regime. I use insights and findings gathered from the drafting process of GC No. 15 to articulate a typology that distinguishes the treaty bodies by their likelihood to need external input when drafting GCs. Drawing on a combination of data – documents and existing scholarship, as well as interviews and personal observations – the case studies ultimately demonstrate the TLC concept to be applicable to drafting processes in other treaty bodies, even where their formation is less likely.

Within the United Nations, the Human Rights Committee and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions are most heavily engaged in the promotion of the right to life, but many other treaty bodies and special procedures address the right to life in some form. In a number of instances, this is because the relevant treaty specifically provides for the right to life (the case with respect to children, international migrants, and persons with disabilities). In others, it is because the customary right to life is not respected whether as a result of a form of discrimination (whether racial or gender-based) or because it and related rights are implicitly protected by the treaty in question (enforced disappearance).

This chapter introduces the evolution of a new field in family law – international human rights family law (IHRFL) – and traces the major role of one of the human rights treaty-monitoring bodies, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), in forming this field. In this new field, issues that have traditionally been thought of as solely part of the domestic legal order (i.e., under the jurisdiction and authority of each state) are now perceived to be part of international human rights law: protection from domestic violence; aspects of child custody; inheritance and property distribution upon dissolution of family relations. This means that family law should be understood as also governed by international human rights standards, whether they are hard law provisions in international treaties, or soft law jurisprudence of treaty bodies. States that have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) must scrutinise their family laws and bring them in line with the standards set by the CEDAW Committee in such matters as property relations, inheritance, protection from domestic violence and child custody. Through its standard setting function (i.e., the adoption of Concluding Observations, Views in Individual Communications, and General Recommendations), the CEDAW Committee is gradually and consistently contributing to the substantive development of IHRFL.

This chapter establishes a framework for the analyis and assessment of the accountability mechanisms of international organizations. I establish a definition of IO accountability mechanisms, as well as a detailed taxonomy of them. I also propose a normative framework for assessing the sufficiency of IO accountability mechanisms, based on the right to remedy and procedural justice research. From these two strands of theory, I establish concrete normative yardsticks for assessing four aspects of IO accountability mechanisms: Access, Voice, Neutrality, and Outcome.

This concluding essay draws on the insights of earlier chapters and provides the author's own conclusions regarding how monitoring bodies in the human rights system should deal with the challenges created by the current wave of exclusionary populism. As the varied accounts illustrate, one size does not fit all. Moreover, international human rights institutions should not address populism as such, but should rather continue to focus on the specific human rights violations that populism leads to, and on the violations that have contributed to the rise of populism. Meanwhile, human rights institutions should also be attentive to the criticisms that populists have directed against the international human rights system, some of which (as examples show) may be meritorious even within a human rights analysis. These recommendations would not solve the problem that the spread of populism poses, but they would enable human rights institutions to contribute positively toward particular solutions.