The goal of Chapter 5 is to respond to a long-standing objection to the PDE known as the closeness problem. The problem is supposed to arise because intentions are sufficiently fine-grained that an agent need not intend harm in nearly any situation. The PDE therefore fails to rule out conduct that is intuitively objectionable in a host of cases unless it is supplemented with a criterion of excessive closeness, whose role is to identify things that are “too close” to harm to be considered incidental for purposes of double effect. However, it also proves extremely difficult to specify a criterion of closeness that is not arbitrary or subject to counterexamples. The closeness problem is often thought to be particularly acute for Anscombe-style accounts of intentional action, such as the one I presented in Chapter 4. I argue, however, that the magnitude of the closeness problem has been exaggerated and that the PDE does not need to be supplemented by a criterion of closeness.

One way of motivating the PDE is by appealing to our intuitions about cases. We might wonder, however, whether there is any deeper rationale for the principle. In Chapter 2, I argue that proponents of double effect face the grounding challenge: The challenge of providing a theoretical rationale that explains why the distinction between intentional harm and incidental harm is relevant for evaluating the moral permissibility of human conduct. I first show how the PDE accounts for common intuitions about a number of cases that might otherwise seem puzzling. Next, I provide four reasons why the PDE cannot be sufficiently justified solely on the basis of its agreement with case-based intuitions. I then examine six proposed rationales, and I argue that each is vulnerable to serious objections. The thrust of the discussion is therefore critical, but at the end of the chapter, I draw some lessons from the failures of these proposals. This sets the stage for Chapter 3, where I turn to the constructive project of developing a novel rationale.

Chapter 13 covers LOAC that permits or restricts the targeting of enemy objects: “military objectives.” Lawful military objectives are defined. Economic targets and war-sustaining targets, contentious issues, are described, with the US minority position noted. World War II’s area bombing by all parties to the conflict is shown to be unlawful, unproductive and, today, unlawful. The widely used targeting criteria, lawful by virtue of nature, location, purpose or use, is expanded upon, with examples of each qualifier. That is followed by relating the six-step targeting process employed by US units in combat. Collateral damage and its avoidance efforts are discussed at length, with emphasis on Chapter 7’s core principles of distinction and proportionality. Unique targeting issues such as “dangerous forces” and dual-use targets are covered, with examples. Precautions in the attack do not sound particularly significant but they are essential LOAC constants. Two recent trial records are included in the Cases and Materials section to illustrate real-world legal consequences of disregarding the illegalities of targeting human beings, even ones’ enemies.