We analyse TFP growth in the US business sector using a basic unobserved component model where trend growth follows a random walk and the noise is a first order autoregression. This is fitted using a Kalman-filter methodology. We find that trend TFP growth has declined steadily from 1.5 to 1.0 per cent per year over the past 50 years. Nevertheless, recent trends are not a good guide to actual medium-term TFP growth. This exhibits substantial variations and is quite unpredictable. Techno-optimists should not give best to productivity pessimists simply because recent TFP growth has been weak.

This paper explores the main determinants of productivity growth. The analysis is performed using Spanish firm-level data. We define a framework where the relative magnitudes of alternative, but not exclusive, sources of technical change are simultaneously estimated. Our main finding is that the average total factor productivity (TFP) growth is fully explained by embodied technical progress (i.e., either new capital goods or human capital). Our results contradict the existence of a positive contribution of economywide neutral technological progress in determining average TFP growth. They also leave little room for large, unpriced effects external to the firm, both at the aggregate and at the industry level. We find evidence of firm-specific learning by doing, short-lived and due to adoption of new processes.

This paper shows that growth and income distribution dynamics are closely linked through occupation, financial intermediation, and education. We use micro data from Thailand for 1976–1996. The compositional changes across these characteristics account for half of the Thai inequality increase and 40% of the Thai growth and poverty reduction. Financial deepening and educational expansion contributed to increasing inequality, whereas occupational transformation contributed to poverty alleviation. The changes in income gaps across the income–status groups, that is, divergence and then convergence, give rise to inverted-U inequality dynamics. These two growth-related components of inequality dynamics, composition and income-gap dynamics, explain virtually all the change in overall inequality, except its initial rise. Thus, inequality dynamics can be viewed as an integral part of the wider process of growth, as Kuznets speculated.

This paper evaluates claims that European productivity growth has been undermined by weak competition and excessive regulation and taxation. The argument has some validity in the context of the information and communications technology (ICT) revolution which has placed a greater premium on flexibility. The UK has been well-placed to benefit from ICT but experiences a productivity gap reflecting historically-low investment combined with high employment of low-productivity workers. Rapid Irish growth has benefited greatly from low corporate taxation but the massive contribution of ICT production to productivity growth suggests it is a special case not a role model.