This article examines the idea of the sui generis in international law and explores how these exceptions structure international legal thought. Exceptions are useful to international law theorizing because they create easy manageable narratives which explain situations not fitting traditional paradigms, yet as a category in their own right – specifically how they are structured and how they operate – they are often undertheorized. The two examples explored in this article are sui generis actors and the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction. I demonstrate the foundational role played by (state-)territorialized thinking in the creation of oppositional categories: state and non-state, and the non-exceptional and exceptional exercise of jurisdiction. The category of exceptions has significantly expanded from the likes of the Holy See and irregular exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to a broad array of actors, such as international organizations and transnational corporations, playing growing and varied roles in contemporary law-making and governance and the regular exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by states. Rather than continuing with this overextended category, the article argues it is instead possible, by rethinking international law’s spatial imaginary, to first, better understand the spaces of non-state actors and regularized exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and second, eradicate the now overstretched legal category of ‘sui generis’.

Geographical Indications (GIs) have been a ‘must-have’ element for EU FTAs in the last decade. Contemporaneously, the USA has contested these EU GI provisions in its own FTAs often with the same countries. The impacts of the EU-US contestation on GIs on a third country are not sufficiently understood. China has been a long-standing example of the EU-US GI contestation. This article examines how the competing demands of EU-US GI contestation have contributed to the ‘Chinese GI Schizophrenia’, which features triplicate GI protection mechanisms coexisting simultaneously and independently. It discusses how the symptom has developed when China was navigating GI regulations bilaterally and multilaterally in the last four decades, how China has made efforts to manage this schizophrenia through institutional integration, and how recent agreements with the EU and the USA respectively further worsened the situation. Using the case of Chinese GI Schizophrenia, this article warns of similar consequences for any country signing bilateral GI agreements with both the EU and the USA: a compliance dilemma that can ultimately cast doubts on the legitimacy of GI rules and create rule complexity that can bring enormous uncertainty to agri-food producers and exporters.

Traditional knowledge forms the fabric of indigenous communities’ social and economic life. Its attempted protection through intellectual property law has been dismal. There is now wide consensus that sui generis regimes should be employed for this purpose, and that customary laws are conceivable as an integral part of such protection. This article finds that the expressed legislative intent to protect traditional knowledge through customary law in Kenya is ill-fated. Sustained inclusive subordination of the latter will obstruct any meaningful efforts to protect the former. This finding is reached by an examination of the historical application of African customary law in personal law regimes that have it as the defining legal regimen. This history is one of subtle subordination, and such subtlety remains embedded even in Kenya's law on traditional knowledge. The unpleasant effects of this phenomenon as observed in personal law regimes are likely to recur for traditional knowledge.

Three main areas for further development of policies or regulatory options for animal genetic resources (AnGR) were identified in a study on the exchange, use and conservation of AnGR (Hiemstra et al., 2006):

1. how to halt the further erosion of genetic diversity and promote sustainable breeding and use,

2. whether there is a need to further regulate the exchange of genetic material and

3 how to balance different systems of property and use rights.

This paper provides an in-depth analysis regarding the third challenge, that of addressing the problems and options available for balancing the different property right systems for AnGR.