As judicial elections become increasingly expensive, recusal has emerged as a way to address concerns about the impartiality of judges who receive contributions from lawyers or potential litigants. While it is unclear if strict recusal rules are the best remedy for conflicts of interest created by contributions, they may disincentivize potential donors from investing in judicial campaigns by negating their potential goal of influencing decisions. We consider whether donor behavior in judicial campaigns – especially for those donors most likely to be interested in specifically currying favor with judges – responds to differences in recusal standards. Using data from 219 state supreme court races in 22 states from 2010 to 2020, we find that states with stricter recusal rules attract fewer campaign donations to judicial races, and states with more lax rules attract more overall and, most especially, for attorney donors.

We build upon Brace, Langer, and Hall’s (2000, The Journal of Politics 62: 387–413) original measure of American state supreme court justice ideology – the PAJID scores. To do so, we gather new data on 1,666 state supreme court justices who served between 1970 and 2019 and update the PAJID scores throughout this period. Testing indicates that PAJID scores are a valid measure of state supreme court justices’ policy preferences and compare favorably, though less efficiently, to others such as Bonica and Woodruff (2015, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 31: 472–98) and Windett, Harden, and Hall (2015, Political Analysis 23: 461–9). Given limited data availability for other ideological measures pre-1990 and post-2010, we conclude that these updated PAJID scores should prove attractive to scholars studying state courts during these periods and among those who desire additional state supreme court ideological data for robustness checks.

We examine how institutional selection procedures affect the ideology of state supreme court chief justices. We argue that institutional selection methods empower those charged with choosing chief justices to select court leaders who reflect their own preferences, and we test this theory using data from all 50 American states from 1970 to 2017. Our results show that states that use popular elections to select chief justices tend to produce court leaders whose preferences reflect the electorate, and states that use commission-assisted elite appointment tend to produce chief justices whose preferences mirror those of political elites. While we find that peer election systems produce leaders with preferences similar to median court preferences, court preferences are also associated with other methods of chief justice selection.

We argue that perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court can be influenced by stimuli paired with state courts. People with low levels of court knowledge will exhibit an assimilation effect in which residing in a state with an elected supreme court increases perceptions of the Court being political. People with greater knowledge will demonstrate a contrast effect, meaning that the Court will be perceived as less political compared to an elected state court. Using existing survey data and a new survey experiment, we find evidence of the assimilation effect for low-knowledge participants. Our results imply that fundamental perceptions of the Supreme Court can be shaped by stimuli that are objectively unconnected to the Court, and that many people do not effectively differentiate between different types of court.

We evaluate the politics of interim judicial appointments at the state level. Although nominating commissions have been established to promote merit-based selection, we argue that governor-applicant ideological concordance and financial support for a governor’s campaigns increase one’s odds of being appointed. We focus on the impact of political factors, as well as the qualifications of prospective judges. We analyze over 4,000 applications to fill interim judicial vacancies in Georgia from 1991 to 2014. Our findings indicate that ideological proximity and campaign donations to the governor increased the likelihood of appointment to the bench with their influence overpowering some indicators of competence.

The state courts of last resort are vital components of American judicial system, disposing of many important legal matters. The chief justices of these courts serve consequential roles in these institutions. Although scholars have examined the selection and duties of states' chief justices, their interactions with the elected branches are understudied. We focus on how chief justices on state high courts use their roles to encourage judicial reform. Specifically, we examine the determinants of chief justices' successes or failures as advocates for their justice systems. To analyze why chief justices succeed or fail as reform advocates, we analyze the fate of reform proposals offered in state of the judiciary addresses. Our results indicate that greater ideological similarity between the state legislature and chief justice or state supreme court median increases the odds of an agenda item being enacted. We also find that the scope of a policy request influences the likelihood it will be granted.

Does the use of judicial review by unelected judges harm public support for their decisions? Scholars have often answered this question in the affirmative. We examine the extent to which the use of judicial review reduces the ability of judges to achieve acceptance of their decisions, arguing that decisions made by elected judges may be more palatable to the public. Our experimental evidence demonstrates that the public is less prone to accept both decisions made by appointed judges and judicial decisions that strike down laws. However, the public is no more likely to accept the use of judicial review by an appointed court than an elected court. The results have implications both for institutional design in the American states and the microfoundations of judicial independence.