It has generally been maintained that UK companies embrace a shareholder value approach. But some commentators have challenged that view. This article documents an attempt to ascertain the actual position in UK companies by an analysis of the position taken concerning corporate objective by 50 of the largest companies in the UK. The research consists of an examination of the public documents of these companies, namely those that could be accessed from the companies' websites, and the primary document considered was the company's most recent Annual Report. The study found that companies could be divided into three groups with one group consisting of 36% of the companies considered, stating that they have shareholder value as their ultimate goal. But, critically, it also found that most of these companies indicated that non-shareholding stakeholders were important to them.

In the discussion on the causes of the financial crisis three main lines of argument can be distinguished: The „regulatory failure“ argument, the theory of the cyclical instability of financial markets, and analyses of „financialization“. From a sociological point of view, the latter analyses deserve particular interest, as they consider the crisis in the context of the larger structural changes of mature capitalist societies that have developed since the last decades of the 20th century. The paper first provides an overview of the financialization literature, focussing of the interplay between the changes on the macro-, meso- and micro levels of society that led to the present dominance of the financial services sector over the economy. Moreover, the historical analyses of Arrighi and Silver are considered. The second part of the paper offers a theoretical reconceptualization of the empirical findings in the framework of a multilevel model of capitalist dynamics. The model shows how a prosperous capitalist economy like the Western one in the second half of the 20th century can be transformed into a financialized economy due to its own internal dynamics. From a sociological perspective, financialization can thus be understood as a hegemonial regime of financial investors over entrepreneurs.

In this paper we present many investigations into the results of simulating the process of hedging a vanilla option at discrete times. We consider mainly a ‘maxi’ option (paying Max(A, B)), though calls, puts and ‘minis’ are also considered. We show the sensitivity of the variability of the hedging error to the actual investment strategy adopted, and to the many ways in which the simulated real world can diverge from the assumed option pricing model. We show how prudential reserves can be calculated, using conditional tail expectations, and how net premiums or fair values (which we present as the same) can be calculated, allowing for the necessary prudential reserves. We use two bond models, the very simple Black-Scholes one and a less unrealistic one. We also use the Wilkie model as an even more realistic real-world model, allowing for many complications in it to make it more realistic. We make observations on the important difference between real-world models and option pricing models, and emphasise the latter as the way of getting hedging quantities, and not just option prices.

Corporate governance and the theory of the firm are discussed primarily from the shareholders' perspective. This point of view neglects the tremendous effects of private pensions and of co-determination as well as interdependencies between codetermination, pensions and corporate governance. Since in the private pension world the firm serves as an investment tool, the focus should be shifted from short-term interests to concepts maximising long-term shareholder value. In this context, also moderate forms of co-determination might serve as a tool for long-term oriented corporate governance. Given the rise of the European Company, co-determination is likely to spread in Europe. Both, private pension-based corporate governance systems and stakeholder-oriented corporate governance systems should be re-examined in the light of the financial and economic crisis and due to the rise of behavioural law and economics.

During the 1980s and 1990s the argument that “maximizing shareholder value” results in superior economic performance came to dominate the corporate governance debates. In this paper, I outline the rationale for the shareholder-value perspective, and show that, rooted in agency theory, it lacks a theory of innovative enterprise. Hence it cannot be used to analyze the conditions under which the stock market supports or undermines the process of value-creation. To go beyond agency theory and its shareholdervalue perspective, I present a framework for analyzing the functions of the stock market in the business corporation and the influence of these functions on the social conditions of innovative enterprise. I then use this framework to explain why in the United States since the 1990s there has been a widespread trend in corporate stock repurchases, including a sharp acceleration in buybacks since 2003. Focusing on a list of the largest corporate repurchasers in the United States, I raise questions concerning the relation between stock buybacks and value-creating investments in the US economy as a whole. I conclude with a discussion of why companies do stock repurchases, and in particular whether they can be justified as a contribution to innovative enterprise. I argue that the ultimate justification for stock repurchases is the ideology of “maximizing shareholder value” - an ideology that works to the direct benefit of corporate executives who make corporate resource allocation decisions and who derive high levels of remuneration from munificent stock option awards.