A wide range of animal taxa, including vertebrates and invertebrates, are controlled or kept by humans. They may be used as pets, for recreation, sport and hobbies, as working animals, as producers of animal-derived (food) products or as biomedical models in research. There is a need for clear guidance on the treatment of animals, regardless of their phylogenetic distance from humans. Current animal welfare concepts, which emphasise animal sentience and the ability of animals to experience negative or positive mental states, are limited in scope to a small proportion of the animal kingdom, as the vast majority of species are (currently) thought to lack sentience. We discuss four options for addressing the question of which basic concept(s) could be used to derive guidelines for the treatment of animal species, sentient or non-sentient: (1) alternative concepts tailored to specific groups of species; (2) ‘welfare’ concepts not presupposing sentience; (3) the precautionary principle; or (4) the concept of animal integrity. Since questions regarding the appropriate treatment of animals, including species with a large phylogenetic distance from humans, have an ethical/moral dimension, we also address who counts morally and how much, and how animals should be treated given their moral status. We suggest that the concept of animal integrity, possibly complemented and extended by the concept of habitat/ecosystem integrity, is suitable for application to all species. However, a current concept of animal welfare should serve as the primary basis for guidance on how to treat species that are sentient and capable of experiencing emotions.

In the future, when we compare the welfare of a being of one substrate (say, a human) with the welfare of another (say, an artificial intelligence system), we will be making an intersubstrate welfare comparison. In this paper, we argue that intersubstrate welfare comparisons are important, difficult, and potentially tractable. The world might soon contain a vast number of sentient or otherwise significant beings of different substrates, and moral agents will need to be able to compare their welfare levels. However, this work will be difficult, because we lack the same kinds of commonalities across substrates that we have within them. Fortunately, we might be able to make at least some intersubstrate welfare comparisons responsibly in spite of these issues. We make the case for cautious optimism and call for more research.

We are sometimes unsure of the moral status of our relationships with other entities. Recent case studies in this uncertainty include our relationships with artificial agents (robots, assistant AI, etc.), animals, and patients with “locked-in” syndrome. Do these entities have basic moral standing? Could they count as true friends or lovers? What should we do when we do not know the answer to these questions? An influential line of reasoning suggests that, in such cases of moral uncertainty, we need meta-moral decision rules that allow us to either minimize the risks of moral wrongdoing or improve the choice-worthiness of our actions. One particular argument adopted in this literature is the “risk asymmetry argument,” which claims that the risks associated with accepting or rejecting some moral facts may be sufficiently asymmetrical as to warrant favoring a particular practical resolution of this uncertainty. Focusing on the case study of artificial beings, this article argues that this is best understood as an ethical-epistemic challenge. The article argues that taking potential risk asymmetries seriously can help resolve disputes about the status of human–AI relationships, at least in practical terms (philosophical debates will, no doubt, continue); however, the resolution depends on a proper, empirically grounded assessment of the risks involved. Being skeptical about basic moral status, but more open to the possibility of meaningful relationships with such entities, may be the most sensible approach to take.

Human brain organoids (HBOs) are three-dimensional biological entities grown in the laboratory in order to recapitulate the structure and functions of the adult human brain. They can be taken to be novel living entities for their specific features and uses. As a contribution to the ongoing discussion on the use of HBOs, the authors identify three sets of reasons for moral concern. The first set of reasons regards the potential emergence of sentience/consciousness in HBOs that would endow them with a moral status whose perimeter should be established. The second set of moral concerns has to do with an analogy with artificial womb technology. The technical realization of processes that are typically connected to the physiology of the human body can create a manipulatory and instrumental attitude that can undermine the protection of what is human. The third set concerns the new frontiers of biocomputing and the creation of chimeras. As far as the new frontier of organoid intelligence is concerned, it is the close relationship of humans with new interfaces having biological components capable of mimicking memory and cognition that raises ethical issues. As far as chimeras are concerned, it is the humanization of nonhuman animals that is worthy of close moral scrutiny. A detailed description of these ethical issues is provided to contribute to the construction of a regulative framework that can guide decisions when considering research in the field of HBOs.

This paper provides the first detailed documentation of aspectual properties of motion verbs in Blackfoot (an Algonquian language) from the Kainaa dialect. In particular, the focus of the paper is to detail how a sentient subject in this language is associated with an inherent endpoint of motion events (i.e., delimitedness). I show that in Blackfoot, an event can have a delimited construal when a sentient subject is an agent (but not a theme). A language-specific requirement for event delimitedness is thus the presence of an external argument that is sentient, which I formalize as a feature [m(ental state)] on a DP, as in Ritter (2015). A major contribution of the current study is thus to show that event delimitedness can be constrained by formal features of the external argument, whereas previously only the internal argument was thought to be involved in event delimitedness.

This paper will ask whether the legal status presently afforded to nonhuman animals ought to influence regulatory debates concerning human cerebral organoids. The New York Courts recently refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus to Happy the Elephant as she was property rather than a legal person while at the same time accepting that she is a moral patient deserving of rights protection. An undesirable situation has therefore arisen in which the law holds a being with moral status to be incapable of benefitting from legal redress due to their legal status as property.

The author argues that this is something that we ought to avoid when designing the regulatory framework which will govern the use of human cerebral organoids. Yet, a difference exists in that, whereas the judges already accept Happy is a moral patient, there is presently no consensus around the moral status of organoids. This paper will consider whether human cerebral organoids have passed the moral threshold of sentience. If they have, or are close to doing so, regulators ought to consider their legal status in advance so as to ensure that adequate limitations are placed on this usage so as to avoid unethical practices.

Non-human animal chimeras, containing human neurological cells, have been created in the laboratory. Despite a great deal of debate, the status of such beings has not been resolved. Under normal definitions, such a being could either be unconventionally human or abnormally animal. Practical investigations in animal sentience, artificial intelligence, and now chimera research, suggest that such beings may be assumed to have no legal rights, so philosophy could provide a different answer. In this vein, therefore, we can ask: What would a chimera, if it could think, think about? Thinking is used to capture the phenomena of a novel, chimeric being perceiving its terrible predicament as no more than a laboratory experiment. The creation of a thinking chimera therefore forces us to reconsider our assumptions about what makes human beings (potentially) unique (and other sentient animals different), because, as such, a chimera’s existence bridges our social and legal expectations about definitions of human and animal. Society has often evolved new social norms based on different kinds of (ir)rational contrivances; the imperative of non-contradiction, which is defended here, therefore requires a specific philosophical response to the rights of a thinking chimeric being.

Anthropocentric claims about the ways in which non-human animals (hereafter animals) interact in their social and non-social worlds are often used to influence decisions on how animals can or should be used by humans in various sorts of activities. Thus, the treatment of individuals is often tightly linked to how they are perceived with respect to their ability to perform behaviour patterns that suggest that they can think - have beliefs, desires, or make plans and have expectations about the future. Here, I review some basic issues in the comparative study of animal minds and discuss how matters of mind are related to matters of welfare and well-being. Much comparative research still needs to be done before any stipulative claims can be made about how an individual's cognitive abilities can be used to influence decisions about how she or he should be treated. More individuals from diverse species whose lives, sensory worlds, motor abilities and nervous systems are different from those of animals with whom we identify most readily or with whom we are the most familiar, need to be studied. As others, I stress the importance of subjectivity and common sense along with the use of empirical data in making decisions about animal welfare, and that subjective assessments should be viewed in the same critical light as are supposedly objective scientific facts. I also argue that whatever connections there are between an individual's cognitive abilities and what sorts of treatment are permissible can be overridden by that individual's ability to feel pain and to suffer. When we are uncertain, even only slightly, about their ability to experience pain or to suffer, individual animals should be given the benefit of the doubt. There is a great deal of uncertainty about the phylogenetic distribution of pain and suffering.

It is believed widely, and with good reason, that some other members of the animal kingdom, like us, have feelings (associated with brain states induced by various sensory inputs and cognitive processes) which can be pleasant or unpleasant. Associated with the strengthening scientific foundations for this belief, there has been growing consensus around the world that we have a moral responsibility, in all of our dealings and interactions with sentient animals, to take account of their feelings. This has led to widespread re-evaluation, in recent years, of the nature of our interactions with other animals. However, assessment of the feelings of animals — the quality of their lives — remains a great challenge for veterinarians and others involved with their management. The fundamental difficulty is that whilst judgements about management or treatment often have to be made on the basis of our inferences of how they feel (ie of the feelings they consciously experience), a subjective step cannot be avoided in making these inferences. We cannot know how other animals feel but can only infer this based on our knowledge of the animal and on our own experiences of feelings. This inevitable ‘gap’ in objective deductions about feelings is often wide enough that people can reach radically different conclusions when judging an animal's quality of life. Opinions thus often differ regarding the point at which it becomes kinder to euthanase an animal than not to do so, the point at which it becomes kinder not to undertake a potentially painful therapeutic intervention than to do so, and where the balance lies when animal welfare costs are being ‘weighed’ against some benefit of their use for humans (eg as laboratory, farm or companion animals). The aim of this meeting is to discuss if and how science has helped in developing reasoned approaches to these dilemmas, and to consider the need for further research, education, and policy development.

Welfare is the state of an animal on a continuum, from poor to good, so many decisions about it are decisions of degree, such as how much feed, space or environmental enrichment should be provided. Other decisions are more discrete, such as whether animals should be kept in cages. However, in practice, many such decisions also involve a range of possibilities — such as whether laying hens should be kept in conventional cages, furnished cages, other housed systems or free range — so that decisions within the range are also of degree. Furthermore, in broader contexts, such as husbandry standards for farm animals, decisions are needed as to how many criteria are to be addressed, which are also decisions of degree. Similarly, decisions about which species to protect and from how early in individual development they need protection are to some extent categorical. This is sometimes referred to as ‘line drawing.’ However, this mainly refers to whether or not animals are sentient, and sentience is not clearly distinguished from other aspects of animals’ cognition and responses, so there is no conclusive boundary between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots.’ So, these decisions are also of degree: is there sufficient evidence to ‘move the line’ further? When there are pressures against change, such as financial cost, should welfare advocates ask for small or large changes? The answer to this question will depend upon circumstances. But discussion of different circumstances suggests that compromise, realism, gradualism and pragmatism are all important in achieving improvements in animal welfare, while noting that other tactics also contribute in particular contexts.

Zoo- and anthropomorphism may both be scientific heresies but both may serve as a basis for thought (and real) experiments designed to explore our ability to assess quality of life as perceived by another sentient animal. Sentience, a major contributor to evolutionary fitness in a complex environment, implies ‘feelings that matter’. Strength of motivation is a measure of how much they matter. Since humans and most domestic animals share the property of sentience, it follows that some aspects of feeling may be similar, and where we differ, the differences may be of degree rather than absolute. One of the assumed absolutes that I shall challenge is the concept that non-human animals live only in the present. I explore how domestic animals may experience the feelings of hunger, pain, fear and hope. Hunger is indisputably a primitive sensation. Pain and fear are primitive sensations with emotional overtones. The problem is to discover how they may affect quality of life. Acute pain and fear are positive signals for action to avoid harm. These actions and their consequences (‘how well did I cope?’) will be committed to memory and affect how an animal feels when they recur, or it fears they may recur. Hope (and its antithesis, despair) are considered by many philosophers (who do not own dogs) as emotions restricted to humans since only we can imagine the future. However, by application of zoomorphism we may classify hope with hunger as a primitive feeling of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Either may lead to action directed towards the goal of feeling better or encourage the belief that things will get better (food will arrive). Both are feelings of expectation for the future modulated in the light of past experience. With all these four emotions quality of life may be expressed in terms of how well the animal feels it can cope, both in the present and in the future. When it feels it cannot cope, then it will suffer.

In this article I reflect on my experience of adapting physically, mentally and spiritually to a medical trauma that had life-changing consequences. I consider how, over 7 years to the time of writing, mental difficulties were inseparable from the physical; and how, for me, both are aspects of a form of understanding knowable only as mystery. Writing from a position of religious faith, I try to convey my experiences in a way that will be of interest to others regardless of their views. At the end, I reflect on aspects of my care that might be particularly relevant for a holistic, person-centred therapeutic approach.

Moral and political philosophers no longer condemn harm inflicted on nonhuman animals as self-evidently as they did when animal welfare and animal rights advocacy was at the forefront in the 1980s, and sentience, suffering, species-typical behavior, and personhood were the basic concepts of the discussion. The article shows this by comparing the determination with which societies seek responsibility for human harm to the relative indifference with which law and morality react to nonhuman harm. When harm is inflicted on humans, policies concerning negligence and duty of care and principles such as the ‘but for’ rule and the doctrine of double effect are easily introduced. When harm is inflicted on nonhumans, this does not happen, at least not any more. As an explanation for the changed situation, the article offers a shift in discussion and its basic terminology. Simple ethical considerations supported the case for nonhuman animals, but many philosophers moved on to debate different views on political justice instead. This allowed the creation of many conflicting views that are justifiable on their own presuppositions. In the absence of a shared foundation, this fragments the discussion, focuses it on humans, and ignores or marginalizes nonhuman animals.