When we study technology transitions of the past – the shifts from horses to cars, from cesspools to sewers, from traditional farming to intensive agriculture – we can see how they were enabled and accelerated by government policy. Coordinated action by groups of countries could accelerate change even more – through faster innovation, larger economies of scale, and level playing fields where needed. International cooperation of this kind could dramatically accelerate low-carbon transitions in each of the greenhouse-gas-emitting sectors of the global economy. Until now, it has barely been attempted.

At COP26, countries representing 70 per cent of the global economy agreed to work together to cross the tipping points where clean technologies outcompete the fossils in each greenhouse-gas-emitting sector of the global economy. This could mark the start of a new era for climate change diplomacy. Success will need support from all sides.

Civil society has been lauded for its ability to act as a social glue that is critical to healthy and functioning democracies. Despite their centrality to US society, nonprofits have lacked legitimacy commensurate with the criticality of their civic purposes. Drawing upon the publicness debate in which government functions under a political authority and business operates within a market authority, Robichau and Fernandez propose a normative “Nonprofitness Framework” that accounts for the moral authority by which nonprofits operate, which is necessary for contributing to a vibrant democracy. A Nonprofitness Framework considers charitable and voluntary organizations in terms of degrees of moral authority and their expression of nonprofit ethos and missions in which some organizations move closer to public or private orientations. Understanding how nonprofits and their agents are conditioned by history and values in turn preserves and cultivates a thriving sector, generating the flexibility to enhance society and provide balance among a dominant private sector and an influential public sector.

At COP26, countries representing 70% of the global economy agreed to work together to cross the tipping points where clean technologies outcompete the fossils in each greenhouse gas emitting sector of the global economy. This could mark the start of a new era for climate change diplomacy. Success will need support from all sides.

When we study technology transitions of the past – the shifts from horses to cars, from cesspools to sewers, from traditional farming to intensive agriculture – we can see how they were enabled and accelerated by government policy. Coordinated action by groups of countries could accelerate change even more – through faster innovation, larger economies of scale, and level playing fields where needed. International cooperation of this kind could dramatically accelerate low-carbon transitions in each of the greenhouse-gas-emitting sectors of the global economy. Until now, it has barely been attempted.

Beyond macroeconomic indicators and simple observations that China, India, and Russia are large and diverse developing countries shedding socialist economies, what is often overlooked is that these countries’ development trajectories are nationally distinct and sectorally variegated. The commonality of market liberalization in the context of their global economic integration has translated into very different pathways to development, revealing stark differences in micro-institutional foundations, which vary by sector. This book unravels the puzzles with three overarching claims. First, mediating the impacts of globalization and economic liberalization on industrialization are dominant nation-specific sectoral patterns of market governance. Market governance structures comprise two dimensions (level and scope of the state in market coordination and dominant distribution of property rights arrangements). The conceptualization recognizes the various state authorities and market actors in coordination mechanisms and broadens measures of institutional quality beyond de jure private property rights and credible commitment. Second, the values and identities of national political economic elites as they respond to objective political and economic pressures internal and external in nature interact with sectoral structures and organization of institutions. The resultant national configurations of sectoral models, the third claim of the book, negotiate global economic integration with impacts on actual development outcomes.

This concluding chapter assesses the Strategic Value Framework for understanding the nonlinear and multidimensional nature of national sector-specific market pathways to development contrary to the expectations about the effects of open economy politics and regime type for particular modes of state-market interactions. The national configurations of sectoral models bridge different scholastic traditions in varieties of capitalism on the interactions between company-level and national-level characteristics and hierarchical state-business relations. Sector-specific dynamics emanating nation-specific sectoral pathways uncover how perceived strategic value and sectoral structures and organization institutions interact to affect how multinational and domestic companies alike experience the emergent institutional foundations of capitalism. This chapter further demonstrates how the new capitalisms play out in other strategic and non-strategic sectors in China, India, and Russia. The book concludes with analyzing the macro effects of the micro-institutional foundations on global conflict and cooperation—from trade wars and cross-border cybersecurity to the Covid-19 global pandemic. The analytical leverage of the Strategic Value Framework in identifying national sector-specific patterns of market governance sheds light on the politics of the management of the Covid-19 pandemic and how they varied across countries and industries within them.

The Strategic Value Framework explicates the dominant sectoral patterns of market governance in China today. Historical process tracing from sectoral origins of labor-intensive textiles and capital-intensive telecommunication in this chapter shows how Chinese state leaders intersubjectively respond to objective economic and political pressures. The perceived strategic value of national security and national technology base took root during foreign interventions and internal upheavals from the Qing dynasty to Chinese Communism and the 1978 Open Door Policy and beyond. The joined imperatives interacting with sectoral structures and organization of institutions shape the central state coordination of predominately state-owned and state controlled economic actors of the centralized governance of strategic sectors with application for national security and contribution to the national technology base, represented by telecommunications. Contrary to open economy politics, this is reenforced after China joins the World Trade Organization and enhances authoritarianism under Xi Jinping. The decentralized governance and private governance characterized by market coordination by local governments and nonstate actors and variegated property rights arrangements of nonstrategic sectors, such as textiles, reveal the limits of regime type and state capitalism explanations. These dominant sectoral patterns have given rise to Chinese-style bifurcated capitalism shaped by techno-security developmentalism in China today.