This Article sheds new light on the long-running debate in EU legal studies about how intense the EU judicial review of complex and uncertain assessments requiring specialist knowledge could and should be. It argues that it is necessary to move beyond formulas and concepts hammered out in the judicial statements of reasons and consider how the institutional context affects legal epistemology. How likely is it that the judges form an independent opinion about the probative value of the presented evidence and the soundness of the administration’s specialist reasoning? How likely is it that their opinion is reliable? Answering these questions helps appraise the boundaries in which judicial review or proliferating administrative review by partly specialised boards of appeal foster the rule of law understood as the pursuit of non-arbitrariness. The Article examines recent case law of the EU Courts and the Board of Appeal of the European Chemical Agency concerning public health and environmental issues, in which complex and uncertain specialist assessments were prevalent. It contends that, due to institutional limitations of EU adjudicatory bodies, a further expansion of the rule of law in EU decision-making requiring specialist knowledge should be pursued through extra-judicial means fostering transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability.

The provision of advice on animal welfare is an important part of the work of scientists in applied ethology, neurophysiology, veterinary epidemiology and other disciplines. Those who request guidance often expect advice that will help them to make progress in difficult discussions. Scientists want to live up to these expectations, but it is also important for them to clarify any scientific limitations. They are normally aware of limits to their advice, but these limits are sometimes not explicitly stated. Using the phrase broadly, we call this kind of limitation ‘scientific uncertainty’. We distinguish between the following four types of uncertainty: I) Ontological uncertainty, relating to the existence of animal feelings and other states relevant for animal welfare. 2) Conceptual uncertainty, stemming from the fact that some of the concepts used in animal welfare science are value-laden if used outside a narrow scientific context. 3) Lack of scientific evidence, stemming from a lack of scientific data on the problem in question. 4) Uncertainty about priorities, relating to the practical conclusions to be drawn in a situation with an open-ended set of ethical and other practical considerations. Scientific uncertainty is unavoidable. It is therefore essential, when giving scientific advice, to state the assumptions on which the advice is based. This makes scientific advice more objective, but also of more limited value to those who do not share the underlying assumptions.

Large-scale societal issues such as public health crises highlight the need to communicate scientific information, which is often uncertain, accurately to the public and policy makers. The challenge is to communicate the inherent scientific uncertainty — especially about the underlying quality of the evidence — whilst supporting informed decision making. Little is known about the effects that such scientific uncertainty has on people’s judgments of the information. In three experimental studies (total N=6,489), we investigate the influence of scientific uncertainty about the quality of the evidence on people’s perceived trustworthiness of the information and decision making. We compare the provision of high, low, and ambiguous quality-of-evidence indicators against providing no such cues. Results show an asymmetric relationship: people react more strongly to cues of low quality of evidence than they do to high quality of evidence compared to no cue. While responses to a cue of high quality of evidence are not significantly different from no cue; a cue of low or uncertain quality of evidence is accompanied by lower perceived trustworthiness and lower use of the information in decision making. Cues of uncertain quality of evidence have a similar effect to those of low quality. These effects do not change with the addition of a reason for the indicated quality level. Our findings shed light on the effects of the communication of scientific uncertainty on judgment and decision making, and provide insights for evidence-based communications and informed decision making for policy makers and the public.

Forthright characterization of scientific uncertainty is important in principle and in practice. Nevertheless, economists and other researchers commonly report findings with incredible certitude, reporting point predictions and estimates. To motivate expression of incredible certitude, economists suggest that researchers respond to incentives that make the practice tempting. This temptation is the ‘lure’ of incredible certitude. I appraise some of the rationales that observers may have in mind when they state that incredible certitude responds to incentives. I conclude that scientific expression of incredible certitude at most has appeal in limited contexts. It should not be a general practice.

After more than three decades of extremely rapid industrial growth, China faces an environmental public health crisis. In this article, I examine pollution in the rural industrial sector and its implications for community health. Drawing on recent ethnographic research in an industrial township in rural Sichuan, including interviews with government officials, environmental regulators, industrial workers and local residents, I explore how community members understand the linkages between air and water pollution from nearby factories and their health and well-being. The article has two main goals. The first is to examine the various ways in which uncertainty about pollution sources, about the severity of pollution levels and about the links between pollution and human health shapes villagers' experiences of pollution on a day-to-day basis. The second goal is to examine the rising trend of “individualization” taking place in China today and explore how this process is related to people's experiences of toxic exposure. I consider the implications of this trend for how social scientists should approach the study of environmental illness in contemporary China.

‘Nanotechnology’, the manipulation of matter on an atomic and molecular scale, is projected to profoundly alter manufacturing systems globally. However, along with the promise that these new technologies hold, there are concerns about the possibility of unknown latent risks to human health or the environment. Under current scientific uncertainties, regulators explore new strategies for overseeing the development and safe use of nanotechnologies. Information disclosure plays a prominent role among these strategies. Thus far, however, the informational strategies actually employed by governments have focused on means by which to collect information from industry, and the types of information requested do not allow for an adequate health risk assessment. Moreover, little effort has been made to make the information collected publicly available. The article addresses the question of what information is disclosed (or not disclosed) and why, highlighting the socio-political context within which these decisions are made, and their democratic implications. It argues that the current ‘light-touch’ disclosure-based approach may lie in technical, evidence-based, ‘risk’ conception, which is common to both the United States and the European Union. It further argues for a more democratic ‘governance-by-disclosure’ approach, which allows society to prioritize risks that it is willing to take to enjoy the benefit of technological progress.