Chapter 2 examines the period from January to October 1979. Domestic troubles spiralled during Carter’s third year at the White House. An economic recession, mounting inflation (resulting from a new oil crisis), and intraparty disagreements all undermined support for the president. Together they conjured images of an administration in turmoil. As the year progressed, the idea of “national weakness” gained traction – invoked by opponents of Carter’s foreign and defense policies. In 1979 Carter came under further pressure to align foreign policy with his political needs. His decision to approve the production of the MX program appeared perverse in light of everything that had preceded it. Here was a notable policy departure, veering well beyond the sort of compromise or rhetorical device that Carter had been forced to deploy earlier in his presidency. Soon after, the bungled US response to the “discovery” of a Soviet brigade in Cuba undermined relations with Moscow, just weeks after the Vienna summit. The political maneuvering, and the administration’s mishandling of the episode, damaged the prospects for ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

Chapter 1 explores the first half of Jimmy Carter’s term as president, from January 1977 through to late 1978. The end of the “imperial presidency,” increased Congressional powers, and the rise of special interest groups complicated life for the new administration. Carter entered the White House amid wide conservative opposition to détente and his pursuit of a new SALT Treaty with the Soviet Union. He began placating critics of the SALT I agreement, particularly Henry Jackson, who had the potential to mobilize discontented, conservative Democrats and independents against a second SALT agreement, as well as Carter’s bid for a second term. The president courted Jackson and acted on his advice in 1977 as he pursued arms control negotiations with Moscow. When Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev rejected the US proposals, Carter changed his approach in order to straddle the demands of his conservative critics and the need to maintain a working relationship with the Kremlin. The chapter also discusses Carter’s decision to promote the cause of human rights in Eastern Europe, the normalization of relations with China, and the quest to ratify the Panama Canal treaties in Congress.