This chapter demonstrates the interplay between domestic and international ideas about birth control and abortion in Republican China (1912–1949). Eugenic discourses linking individual health to national strength and modernity gained currency in the early 1920s. Margaret Sanger’s visit to China in 1922 further fueled elite preoccupation with using contraception to improve the “quality” of the population, while reformers called for an end to social ills, such as abortion, child abandonment, and infanticide. Mirroring the blending of Chinese and foreign eugenic thought, the medical language used to describe birth control merged a primarily traditional Chinese medical discourse with Western and Japanese scientific terminology. Despite their prominence in intellectual circles, many of the high-level arguments for and against birth control had little direct impact on everyday reproductive practices.

Chapter 2 focuses on the praxis of birth control and abortion during the Republican era. Although sterilization and abortion were criminalized, contraception was neither explicitly endorsed nor banned. Yet, at times, local police cracked down on those who sold or consumed these products. In spite of the law, a wide range of contraceptive and abortive techniques were available to women in urban China. Grounded in folk practices, traditional Chinese healing, and Western medicine, abortion was the most prevalent form of fertility regulation that appeared in the historical record. Tiaojingyao – patent drugs and homemade herbal decoctions that blurred the line between abortifacients and emmenagogues designed to induce regular menses – were also particularly common, and by their nature, difficult to police.

The early Republican period in Chinese history witnessed the emergence of a new generation of academic professionals. These new professional historians criticized the centrality of ancient historical time in Chinese historical studies. In contrast, they embraced objectivity as a goal of historical practice and regarded intellectual autonomy as integral to the discipline. With the shift in focus of historical studies, in the 1920s, some new academic professionals carved out a niche for themselves by developing world history into a specific teaching field. By the early 1930s, world historians such as Lei Haizong dedicated themselves to placing China’s past and future within a world-historical context. This chapter contends that the pursuit of intellectual autonomy was, however, interrupted by the war with Japan. At this moment of crisis, world historians exemplified by Lei Haizong became increasingly nationalistic. These historians glorified the unique nature of Chinese culture to promote national identity at a moment of crisis. As a result, a binary opposition between China and the world gradually emerged in Chinese historiography.