After World War One, new institutions and gadgets gave reality to a changing landscape of public culture. Therefore, in this chapter, we explore applied science in the inter-war public realm. Society’s usage interacted with officials’ language as public and bureaucratic discussions of applied science intertwined. Talk about applied science connected intimately with an intense discussion of ‘modern civilisation’ to make sense of science too. Amidst anxiety, the separation of pure and applied became important to science’s standing. To some, the process by which scientific research led to a multitude of new gadgets was frighteningly dangerous. To others, science was exploited too slowly due to the historical inadequacy of British industry. Both branch of government and a cathedral of applied science, the Science Museum displayed linkages between science and technical wonders. Debates were conducted over the new radio service and in newspapers, and were contested by bishops as well as politicians.

The Tunis victory parade, followed by the “fusion” of the Free French and l’armée d’Afrique, symbolized a transition between the old and new French army, rearmed as the result of the Anfa conference, so that French troops might take part in the liberation of their country. For France to assume its “place among the democratic nations of the world,” the French exile movements of de Gaulle and Giraud needed to cooperate, while a third resistance army was mobilizing within the hexagon. How to coordinate, “fuse,” and “amalgamate” these three forces would preoccupy French and Allied leaders for the remainder of the war. Resurrecting French military power in an impoverished and fractious French North Africa would prove problematic. De Gaulle’s 30 May 1943 appearance in Algiers launched his struggle with Giraud for control of the CFLN. The two factions competed to recruit the trickle of évadés de France to Casablanca via Spain, as well as women to fill non-combatant roles, a rivalry, tinged with rancor, that would linger until the war’s end, and become even more complex when the internal resistance was added to the mix. These minor “crises” highlighted just how diminutive French forces actually were in the larger context of the war. They also signaled that French and Allied goals would diverge, as the French leader prioritized the preservation of empire; the restoration of order and the State upon liberation; and securing France’s post-war interests in Germany.

Chapter 2 explores the situation of chaplains from 1933 to 1939. Studies of Nazi Germany often neglect these years, but developments and decisions made at this time proved crucial. The chapter opens with a look at a chaplain who accompanied the Condor Legion to Spain during the Civil War. Pastor Keding’s account encapsulates the central insight of this chapter: during the first six years of Hitler’s rule, a loyal military chaplaincy emerged. The men appointed to serve the new Wehrmacht as military bishops, the Catholic Rarkowski and Protestant Dohrman, were old-fashioned patriots who brought credibility to the chaplaincy. Procedures for selecting chaplains were developed to prioritize keeping out men deemed potential troublemakers. The lingering perception that Christianity had contributed to Germany’s failure to win in 1918 put chaplains on the defensive and led them to try to prove and re-prove their effectiveness. Chaplains seized the opportunity presented by German rearmanent in 1935 to expand their numbers. They endorsed exclusion of Jews and celebrated German triumphs from remilitarization of the Rhineland to annexation of Austria. By September 1939 they were ready for war.

With the Royal Commission now behind them and the Depression receding, Vickers-Armstrongs was once again able to fully focus on business and the needs of their customers. They began to rebuild their exports, but then the international market was reluctantly put aside for British rearmament in anticipation of renewed conflict. Vickers-Armstrongs faced a tsunami of orders across all areas of their business and initially struggled to meet British war needs but ultimately rose to the occasion. Vickers-Armstrongs employees served in government and the firm also oversaw shadow factories in addition to significantly expanding its own production. Their interwar investments in tanks and aircraft were vital to the British war effort, and the Supermarine Spitfire became iconic. In the aftermath of the war a familiar threat to the future of the firm reemerged: nationalization. Vickers-Armstrongs were unable to prevent it and the English Steel Corporation was nationalized by the Labour Government, complicating Vickers-Armstrongs operations. However, when the government fell, the incoming Conservative Government enabled denationalization of English Steel, returning it to the Vickers-Armstrongs fold. The era closes with rearmament for the Korean War.

From late 1934 Churchill and Chamberlain were influenced by intelligence reports on the scale of German rearmament. Churchill successfully pressed the government to accelerate the expansion of the RAF. Chamberlain agreed in principle to a defence loan, thereby making possible much higher defence expenditure than when he had insisted on balanced budgets. Both men supported appeasement of Mussolini when he attacked Ethiopia, since both saw Italy as a potential counterweight to Germany. Both Chamberlain and Churchill advocated an early end to League of Nations sanctions against Italy after the collapse of Ethiopian resistance. The connection between the Ethiopian crisis and the German military occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 is explained, Hitler having been encouraged by the failure of sanctions, the consequent reduction in British prestige and the breach between Italy and the western powers. Churchill denounced the British rearmament programme, announced in the same month, as inadequate, and urged a greater diversion of industry to defence contracts than Chamberlain thought safe. On the other hand, both men gave priority to the air force and opposed a commitment to send the army to France.

Ireland, a small state, and America, a great power, had little in common by 1938–9. But on the eve of the Second World War, security needs brought interaction between the two countries. Both states intensified military preparedness. But the London factor was influential again during negotiations when the American government agreement to sell arms and equipment was with British approval. The chapter concludes that the inevitable inclusion of Ireland in the US-defined war zone illustrated again de Valera’s misunderstanding of US foreign policy concerns. This gap between reality and aspiration was highlighted throughout the war also as Ireland adhered to neutrality while US neutrality was abandoned in 1941 proof also of the differing needs of a small vulnerable state and a great power and their respective leaders.