Chapter 5 examines the powers of the UN Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security and how the notion of collective security has developed since the Charter was adopted. It also looks at the role of peacekeeping and regional organizations within the overall context of collective security.

Hybrid warfare is a widely interpreted and highly contested concept and also a label for opponents and targets in conflict or competition in international relations. It is often projected as being something underhand undertaken by the other, however, this chapter examines the conceptual and operational history of Western hybrid warfare. This refers to creating suitable environmental conditions in the information and cognitive domain as a means to subvert a target government and bring about regime change.

This chapterestablishes peacebuilding as a historically and theoretically evolving concept and practice. Peacebuilding already has prisms open to multiple understandings. Nevertheless, seeing peacebuilding as apolicy process enables us to comprehend that the whole idea and activity cannot be understood from one paradigm exclusively. It is a mixed activity, while still oriented to realizing an ultimate goal,"peace," which has multiple goals and serves multiple interests. Weprovide a comparative analysis of peacebuilding with existing IR theories.Weidentify both similarities and differences between peacebuilding as a policy paradigm and the various IR theories. We contend that the policy approach could complement other theories and further contribute to both academic and practical understandings of peacebuilding. It becomes clearthat peacebuilding is not only a static picture of the theoretical mosaic but a hybrid approachwithdynamic interactions among actors and theories.

There has been widespread support for the idea that the so-called international community has a remedial moral responsibility to protect vulnerable populations from mass atrocities when their own governments fail to do so. But, where exactly is this responsibility located?In other words, which body or bodies can be expected to discharge a duty to safeguard those who lack the protection of – or, indeed, come under threat from – their own government?The question becomes particularly pressing when the United Nations is unwilling or unable to act and there is no one state to fill the breach.

In this chapter, I examine ‘coalitions of the willing’ as one (likely provocative) answer to this question, and explore how the informal nature of such associations should inform the judgements of moral responsibility that we make in relation to them.Perhaps most controversially, I propose that, under certain circumstances, states and other institutional agents have a duty to contribute to forming such an ad hoc association, and then to participate in a collective endeavour – and that these circumstances may include cases of military intervention in response to mass atrocity without UN Security Council authorisation.

In this chapter we evaluate not only how different paradigms approach the topic of peacebuilding but also how they compare and contrast with one another. This essay suggests that despite some clear incompatibilities, realism, liberalism, constructivism, cosmopolitanism, critical theory, public policy, and localism share some common ideas about how to pragmatically resolve conflicts, including focusing on the participants of these conflicts, developing locally grounded solutions, maintaining long-term commitments, and focusing on comprehensive approaches to peace. The main divide, we suggest, is between understandings of power in practice, with the more monist approaches positing that local actions come from structures that are not easily perceived. This critique, however, is minimized by the reality that all of the paradigms agree that peace cannot be sustained without both tempering the prerogatives of power with ideas of equality and consulting local actors. We conclude this chapter with comments about the benefits a cross-paradigmatic approach to peacebuilding has from methodological and theoretical standpoints.

The chapter traces the history of responsibility in the field of security through the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). By using the idea of ‘responsibility’ as a lens through which to assess which and whose interests, objectives, and aims the R2P was designed to advance, and how this was articulated in the inception of R2P, I show that in spite of claimed ancestry, R2P was a product of the late 1990s and the aim to address the lack of international response or intervention in the humanitarian crises of that decade. In so doing, the chapter contributes to broadening our historical account of R2P by linking and situating aspects of R2P to and alongside earlier initiatives of the 1980s.

Unimpeded by questionable “general” theories, the Conflict Management Approach (CMA) holds that conflict is normal, structural, and behavioral and has to be managed in its own terms.The idea that peace is divisibleinto negative and positive phases, though creativein Galtung’s time, is unrealistic. Peace to needs to be broken down further, into more helpful sequences, with more sophisticated distinctions.This chapterdescribes what is meant by the CMA, and compares it tothe other primary theoretical approaches analyzed in this volume. This chapter focuses on the importance of CMA as a hybrid approach, which is liberal in its view of feasibility, realist in its view of the problem, and cosmopolitan in its view of responses.This essay alsoaddresses some of the challenges CMA faces from the “New World of Disorder” and concludes with a brief discussion about the possibilities CMA has as the new “ideal type” for the future of peacebuilding.

This chapter explores two doctrines that developed in response to Security Council paralysis or inaction in the face of atrocity crimes. The first is the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, most famously invoked in 1999 to justify the intervention of NATO in Kosovo, although largely dismissed by most states as impermissible, at least under a strict reading of the UN Charter. The second doctrine is the “responsibility to protect” (“R2P”), which was first formulated in 2001 but has since undergone significant modifications. Because the later formulations of R2P require Security Council authorization for any forceful intervention, R2P ultimately fails to address the problem of Security Council paralysis in the face of atrocity crimes. Furthermore, because R2P was invoked as part of the 2015 intervention in Libya, which left a destabilized state, and appears to have been largely ignored with respect to atrocities in Syria, enthusiasm for R2P may be waning; some ideas for its revitalization are explored in the chapter. The chapter ultimately makes the case that until the international community solves the problem of veto use in the face of atrocity crimes, some states still will be tempted to invoke, or engage in, humanitarian intervention because there are currently no satisfactory alternatives to addressing Security Council paralysis blocking forceful intervention; yet, there remain significant dangers to such an approach. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that by addressing the problem of use, and threatened use, of the veto in the face of atrocity crimes, one could both strengthen R2P and lessen any need to invoke humanitarian intervention.