This chapter examines the relationship between skeptical themes and debates concerning the rationality of religious belief. This relationship manifests itself not only in terms of critiques of the rationality of religious belief, but also in prominent defenses of the rationality of religious belief, such as Lockean evidentialism, reformed epistemology, and skeptical fideism. The discussion puts particular focus on a specific form of skeptical fideism that employs an epistemic parity argument with regard to the epistemological status of religious and everyday belief. In this regard, it considers quasi-fideism, an account of the rationality of religious belief that applies a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to the religious case, and which has a natural affinity with skeptical fideism.

The author argues that the firmness of faith championed by outstanding representatives of the Christian tradition is incompatible with the view that one should always prefer beliefs supported by more evidence to beliefs supported by less evidence. The author considers and refutes some perspectives that more or less implicitly minimize this incompatibility. He argues that the Christian faith offers an opportunity to rethink the nature and purpose of debates and to develop a more comprehensive and fruitful epistemological view.