The method proposed in the Tractatus is to find a perspicuous logic of our language. It thus seems to conform to Russell’s ideal of a scientific method in philosophy. Language, though, is for Wittgenstein essentially the language of the first person. This means that the central issues in the Tractatus, such as ‘What is a sentence?’ and ‘What is a judgement?’, have to be approached by means of a first-person method. Perhaps surprisingly, this method is less vulnerable to psychologism than Russell’s method. How are we to understand the use of the first-person indexical in the Tractatus? It is not used as a referring term: it does not stand for the author, a world-soul, or a transcendental subject. Its function is rather to engage the reader in applying the first-person method when aiming to understand the Tractatus.

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus deploys modal vocabulary, especially “possibility.” Some readers take this to signal commitment to substantive modal theories. For others, it is metaphysical nonsense to be thrown away. We steer a middle path. We uncover the central role of possibility in Wittgenstein’s philosophical development from criticism of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment to the conception of propositions as pictures in the Tractatus. In this conception, modality is not the subject matter of theorizing but an ineluctable aspect of picturing of reality whose showing forth Wittgenstein aims to help us see by operationalizing the construction of propositions.

Before venturing into the study of choreographies, we introduce the formalism of inference systems. Inference systems are widely used in the fields of formal logic and programming languages and they were later applied to theory of choreographies as well.

This first stage of the journey introduces the concept of meaning in language and discourse, discusses the advantages of studying it at the interfaces of semantics, pragmatics, and philosopy, and moves to the correlates of meaning in the mind and in the world. It also addresses the question of the appropriate unit of study – a flexible type of proposition.

This chapter examines Heidegger’s use of seemingly nonsensical sentences in his 1926 Logic lectures to illustrate the primacy of a kind of practical sense, which serves as a basis for a derivative logical-propositional sense. It contrasts Heidegger’s approach with a conception of nonsense emerging out of an “austere” reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, according to which nonsense is never a function of what words mean but only a result of a failure to assign a meaning to one or more elements of a would-be proposition; according to this austere reading, there are thus no nonsensical propositions, but only strings of meaningless signs. Although Heidegger in certain respects hews to this austere conception, viz. in recognizing the interplay between bipolarity and something’s being a proposition at all, his use of nonsense nonetheless departs from the specifics of the austere reading. Doing so, the chapter argues, allows Heidegger to do a kind of phenomenological-ontological work, whose possibility the austere reading renders obscure (at best).

This chapter is the first of four investigating Aquinas’s view that choice is a hylomorphically structured act that inherits its preferential character from a previous judgment of reason. This chapter deals with the judgment preceding choice. The hallmark of this judgment is that it is free. It does not yet investigate this judgment’s free character in this chapter. Rather, here the groundwork is established for its discussion in Chapter 3 by clarifying what a practical judgment generally speaking is, for Aquinas. It argues that, on his view, a practical judgment involves two components, namely, a propositional content and an attitude of assent. It shows that the propositional content in question is an ought-statement or what Aquinas calls a “precept,” where the force of the ‘ought’ is not deontological, but rather means-end-relating. Thus, on Aquinas’s view, the chapter argues, to say that X ought to be done is to say that X ought to be pursued as a means for the sake of some end Y. It also shows that Aquinas draws a distinction between two types of means, expedient and necessary ones, and two types of ends, ultimate and non-ultimate ones, which yields four different types of precepts.

This chapter begins with an overview of several terms important to a discussion of meaning in language, and introduces the reader to the theory of linguistic relativism and the relationship between language and thought. This section transitions into a review of the extension, reference, and the features that begin to form a comprehensive theory of semantics. With this foundation, students turn to a deeper investigation of formal semantics, including definitions for logical expressions and relationships, and then to a presentation of word sense, and the interactions between various parts of speech in the lexicon. The principle of compositionality is introduced, and it is used to explore several examples of non-compositional language. The end of the chapter ties these concepts to an investigation of pragmatics, including politeness, Gricean Maxims, and implicature.

Chapter 6 focuses on meaning and the interpretation of language. It contrasts the meaning of words, which we have stored in our mental lexicon and which we refer to as lexical meaning, with grammatical meaning, such as tense and aspect, gender, and number. There is also pragmatic meaning which depends on our knowledge of the world and contextual information. The difference between denotation, connotation, and reference are explored and basic concepts such a synonymy, antonymy, homonymy, etc. are introduced. Prototype theory is analyzed with appropriate examples. The chapter links to syntax by examining subcategorization, including transitive and intransitive verbs, and also thematic roles and their relation to syntactic structure. It presents the difference between sentences, propositions, and utterances, explaining in depth the importance of truth conditions. The chapter presents important concepts of entailment, contradiction, presupposition, and implicature and concludes with a brief discussion on theoretical frameworks such as cognitive and formal approaches to semantics.

In his 1925 paper ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, G. E. Moore set out his ‘Common Sense view of the World’ as a series of ‘truisms’ about himself and the world. Moore then claims (1) that our common-sense truisms are largely true, and (2) that we know that our common-sense truisms are largely true. In his writings Moore defends (1) against philosophers who argue that common sense is no guide to the nature of reality by distinguishing between the ordinary meaning of his common-sense truisms (which is unproblematic) and their analysis (which is often doubtful). He defends (2) against sceptics by arguing that the assessment of claims to knowledge has to respect the framework of deep common-sense beliefs which shape our evidence. This chapter argues that Moore’s defence of (1) is not persuasive but that the defence of (2) includes important contributions to epistemology.