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4 results

  • Chapter 9 - Reason and Experience in Galen’s Moral Epistemology

  • Edited by R. J. Hankinson, University of Texas, Austin, Matyáš Havrda
  • Book:
    Galen's Epistemology
    Published online:
    04 May 2022
    Print publication:
    12 May 2022, pp 232-249

  • Summary

    The chapter focuses on the central role Galen ascribes to his own first-person ethical and emotional experience in the construction and defense of his ethical theory and therapy of the emotions. I argue that by appreciating the complex role that Galen’s autobiographical episodes play in his moral works, we can better understand both the theory he proposes and his conception of the role that first-person experience and philosophical argument play in moral education and judgment. As I show, Galen’s emphasis on his own first-person ethical experience not only fits well with his more general epistemological view of the importance of experience in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, but also makes a substantive contribution to his account of moral education and emotional therapy.

  • Introduction

  • Edited by Peter Thielke, Pomona College, California
  • Book:
    Kant's Prolegomena
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    21 October 2021, pp 1-8

  • Summary

    Almost every reader’s first encounter with Kant comes through either the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals or the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, but while the former work occupies a central and revered place in the philosophical canon, the Prolegomena is often viewed much more ambivalently.

Kant's Prolegomena
  • A Critical Guide
  • Edited by Peter Thielke
  • Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    21 October 2021
  • The Prolegomena is often dismissed as Kant's failed attempt to popularize his philosophy, but as the essays collected here show, there is much to be gained from a careful study of the work. The essays explore the distinctive features of the Prolegomena, including Kant's discussion of philosophical methodology, his critical idealism, the nature of experience, his engagement with Hume, the nature of the self, the relation between geometry and physics, and what we cognize about God. Newly commissioned for this volume, the essays as a whole offer sophisticated and innovative interpretations of the Prolegomena, and cast Kant's critical philosophy in a new light.

  • Kant on Perception, Experience and Judgements Thereof

  • Banafsheh Beizaei
  • Journal:
    Kantian Review / Volume 22 / Issue 3 / September 2017
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    24 August 2017, pp. 347-371
    Print publication:
    September 2017

  • It is commonly thought that the distinction between subjectively valid judgements of perception and objectively valid judgements of experience in the Prolegomena is not consistent with the account of judgement Kant offers in the B Deduction, according to which a judgement is ‘nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception’. Contrary to this view, I argue that the Prolegomena distinction maps closely onto that drawn between the mathematical and dynamical principles in the System of Principles: Kant’s account of the Prolegomena distinction strongly suggests that it is the Analogies of Experience that make it possible for judgements of perception to give rise to judgements of experience. This means that judgements of perception are objectively valid with regard to the quantity and quality of objects, and subjectively valid with regard to the relation they posit between objects. If that is the case, then the notion of a judgement of perception is consistent with the B Deduction account of judgement.