A conceptual foundation for a process approach in psychology is provided, including the characteristics of a ‘process’ and a process ontology (or metaphysics) and its philosophical roots. We describe how this approach contrasts substantialism and a substance ontology. Here, we introduce what our envisioned process-approach implies for realism, where we discuss the stance that the construal of reality is constructed. With this, we position ourselves as critical realists.

The small and somewhat fringe praxis of processual self-esteem research is described with respect to its enactment of a process ontology. The chapter shows that a process approach has resulted in a focus on ‘how’ questions in self-esteem research (rather than on predictive validity, for example) and a more pluralistic approach to the operationalization of self-esteem. What the various processual-studies reviewed have in common is a conceptual and methodological approach to self-esteem as a situated and action-based process, rather than a thing that individuals have to different degrees. Here, the central role of situational affordances is highlighted. This processual praxis often relies explicitly on complex dynamic systems principles, such as self-organization, emergence, variability, and attractor landscapes. With processes and actions as its focus, this praxis constructs self-esteem knowledge that emphasizes one’s agency in the world and the centrality of our actual context-bound actions and experiences as we move through it. This chapter ends with a discussion of how a process approach is beneficial for the lived reality of self-esteem, where individuals are encouraged to embrace and reflect on their situated and fluctuating experiences of self, rather than a pursuit of ‘high’ self-esteem.

This chapter discusses the practice of measurement in psychological research. Here, where we cast doubt on the basic assumptions and endeavours underlying the act of measuring in mainstream psychology. Next, we introduce the processual alternative, which stresses the study of activity as situated and coupled with an environment. This chapter explains how a process approach to ‘measurement’ is thus fundamentally different from the standard one, and can remedy existing issues related to non-ergodicity and the ecological fallacy. These ideas are illustrated by means of the concept of intelligence, which is undoubtedly one of psychology’s show-pieces of measurement.

A conceptual foundation for a process approach in psychology is provided, including the characteristics of a ‘process’ and a process ontology (or metaphysics) and its philosophical roots. We describe how this approach contrasts substantialism and a substance ontology. Here, we introduce what our envisioned process-approach implies for realism, where we discuss the stance that the construal of reality is constructed. With this, we position ourselves as critical realists.

Organizational actors spend a tremendous amount of time and energy trying to intentionally change their routines. We conceptualize these intentional changes as routine design—intentional efforts to change one or more aspects of a routine to create a preferred situation. We review existing routines research on intentional change by showing how different perspectives on routines have generated different insights about the relationship between intentional change and design. We highlight a cognitive perspective, a practice perspective, and an ontological process perspective on routine design. We then draw on two perspectives inspired by design studies. Simon’s scientific perspective on design suggests that routines scholars study the effects and implications of designing artifacts. Schön’s reflective practice perspective on design suggests that routines scholars can examine how actors set the problem, engage in (re)framing, and in reflection-in-action. These design studies perspectives offer routines scholars a better understanding of efforts to intentionally change routines. Based on these insights from design studies, we develop a future research agenda for routine design.

In this chapter, I revisit key tenets of Routine Dynamics (RD) research to take stock of its progress and note areas for further development, and then show how strong process-cum-practice perspective, which I have called performative phenomenology, may be drawn upon to advance RD research. I argue that RD research will need to: explore how tacit knowledge affects routine enactment; better understand exogenously originated deliberate change in routines; and take explicitly on board the moral dimension of routine enactment.

This chapter uses Adler’s analysis of power to unpack his political and explanatory theory by making two claims. First, Adler’s understanding of power accentuates the agentic components of power – and hence order – and downgrades the role of domination in social order. Whereas his ontology would allow for a wider conception, his communitarian political theory does not. Second, in his explanatory theory, power (as ‘epistemic practical authority’) becomes a central cause for understanding the evolution of social orders. Yet, assuming evolution to be constituted by contingent and contextual processes that remain indeterminate, epistemic practical authority cannot carry this causal weight.