This chapter analyses the increasing trend of African post-conflict states contributing troops to multilateral peace operations. In particular, it focuses on the case studies of Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The authors argue that troop contribution can become a shortcut to reforming, restructuring as well as unifying post-conflict armies through international assistance and training linked to peace operations. This saves budget-constraint post-conflict governments from investing significant funds to the project of building a functional and professional army. In addition, for post-conflict states, which may have remaining domestic issues, sending troops abroad may ease tensions at home and thus facilitate governing. The authors also look into the identity dimension of post-conflict states who contribute troops to peace operations. The decision to contribute troops can assist states to transform their identities from that of post-conflict states to peacekeeping states. Such a transformation can have important consequences on relations with both internal actors and international partners.

Chapter 6 focuses on how the state administration in Sierra Leone is too weak to comply with the Kimberley Process at a high level, despite a preference for compliance. This shows how cooperation is a necessary but not always sufficient condition to bring about a high level of compliance. This research finds that low state capacity in regions where diamond mining takes place leads to widespread smuggling and a moving target for regulators over time. Furthermore, the “alluvial” nature of most diamond deposits in Sierra Leone, where diamonds can be mined with little capital investment, makes certification difficult. The reality of how the Kimberley Process has interacted with the government of Sierra Leone and the motivations of private actors within the country are essential in understanding attempts at homogenizing the domestic policy of states through international regimes and the limitations that result.

In this chapter we develop our theory of the relationship between power-sharing institutions and democracy as “the art of the possible” in post-conflict states. Noting the challenging environment that actors confront following civil war, we evaluate the potential for establishing minimalist democracy in post-conflict states as well as the obstacles that inhibit the creation of democracy in its liberal or participatory forms. Power-sharing institutions help make the emergence of minimalist democracy possible, we argue, by providing former belligerents with the assurances necessary to play by the electoral rules of the game. We further identify two mechanisms via which power sharing helps foster minimalist democracy. The first, which facilitates democracy from above by constraining governments’ ability to abuse their citizens, centers on power sharing’s role in establishing the foundations for an effective system of rule of law. In terms of the second mechanism, power sharing facilitates democracy from below by providing for a more equal distribution of rights and freedoms across social groups.