How large should a monetary policy committee be? Which voting rule should a monetary policy committee adopt? This paper builds on Condorcet's jury theorem to analyse the relationships between committee size and voting rules in a model where policy discussions are subject to a time constraint. It suggests that in large committees majority voting is likely to enhance policy outcomes. Under unanimity (consensus) it is preferable to limit the size of the committee. Finally, supermajority voting rules are social contrivances that contribute to policy performance in a more uncertain environment, when initial policy proposals are less likely to be correct, or when payoffs are asymmetric.

This paper suggests, on the basis of the New Keynesian model, a measure of the degree of conservatism of the European Central Banker. At first, we notice that the appointment of the President of the European Central Bank was made after substantive disagreements about the degree of conservatism (institutional and personal) of the candidates. Secondly, we apply this measure to the change of presidency (from Duisenberg to Trichet) in order to explore the possibility of a step change in the conduct of the ECB's monetary policy. Finally, our results show that once appointed, the two Central Bankers adapted to the institutional framework in which they made decisions.

This article proposes to insert a bank capital channel (BCC) in the theoretical framework proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG), in order 1) to evaluate the mean features of the BCC and 2) to assess the benefits of a countercyclical prudential measure. In a costly state verification framework, banks are charged a financing premium on their external funds which depends on the structure of their balance sheets and which then fluctuates in a counter-cyclical way. This premium is lastly passed on to firms' credit conditions. Simulations confirm that shocks are more amplified than in the BGG model, and confirm the importance of the financial context for macroeconomic volatility. Given the effects of this channel and the ineffectiveness of monetary policy in a capital crunch context, the model finally allows a conclusive evaluation of the advantages associated with a preemptive and counter-cyclical prudential measure in a DSGE model to be made.

Dans la lignée de Svensson (1999) cet article se propose de reconsidérer la question du choix de la cible pour la banque centrale, selon les deux alternatives cible d'inflation ou cible de niveau de prix, sous une courbe de Phillips de type nouveau keynésien. Nos résultats tendent à plaider en faveur de l'adoption par la banque centrale d'une cible de niveau de prix. La comparaison des politiques discrétionnaires, sous les deux type de régimes, à la règle optimale sous engagement définie par Clarida, Gali et Gertler (2000) montre que la préférence pour la cible de niveau de prix s'explique par une meilleure gestion du problème de la crédibilité de la politique monétaire.

This paper deals with some issues that recently arised from the puzzling evolution of Stock Markets during the nineties, in particular from the sharp increase of equity prices on the Nasdaq. We examine the hypothesis according to which such a bullish market could be explained by investors’ increasingly optimistic expectations about the ‘New economy’ perspectives. We then analyse to what extent the evolution of financial markets may have recently affected aggregate demand in a stronger way than in the past. Using a simple aggregate model with rational expectations, we finally show how monetary policy decisions should be influenced by such changes in the behaviour of investors and consumers.