Chapter 6 examines a different kind of bodily anomaly which informed some of the early modern period’s most influential thinking on cognition and nociception – phantom limb syndrome. This curious phenomenon is clearly described in texts by Ambroise Paré. It comes to the fore, however, in the work of René Descartes, who found in this bodily anomaly a fascinating test case for his theory of ‘non-resemblance’ in the senses. As I explore, the nature of phantom limbs seemed to Descartes to confirm his idea that pain sensations occurred in the mind rather than in the body, thus reaffirming his notion of the body as object. In this capacity, phantom limbs occur in other contemporary texts, including in the first known autobiographical description of phantom limb syndrome. Looking closely at Descartes’ published works and correspondence, however, we can see how the strangeness of phantom limbs challenged this philosopher to re-examine his own thinking about perception and the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness.

This chapter examines the concept of the self. It begins by looking at the work of Hume, and the distinction between ego and bundle theories of the self. We consider the distinction between the knower and the known, and the idea of the homunculus. The chapter examines Damasio’s model of three levels of self, and other ‘types’ of self. It looks at how the self is related to psychological models of control and executive processing. It then looks at our perception of our continuity of existence, and how it can be disrupted by age, sleep and amnesia. The chapter examines the neuroscience of the self, and which neurological structures give rise to our sense of self. We look in detail at split-brain studies and what we can learn from them. It then looks at dissociative states and dissociative identity disorders (multiple personalities). It also looks at the boundaries of the self, and phantom limbs and the rubber hand illusion. The chapter concludes by asking whether the self is just another illusion.