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  • 21 - Non-reductionism, Eliminativism, and Modularity in RDoC: Thoughts about a Progressive Mechanistic Science

  • from Section 7
  • Edited by Kenneth S. Kendler, Virginia Commonwealth University, Josef Parnas, University of Copenhagen, Peter Zachar, Auburn University, Montgomery
  • Book:
    Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
    Published online:
    02 April 2020
    Print publication:
    02 April 2020, pp 267-274

  • Summary

    In a commentary on Miller and Bartholomew, Zachar notes that the Research Domain Criteria initiative (RDoC) has always represented an incursion of cognitive neuroscience and factor analytic dimensional models from psychology into biological psychiatry, and that non-reductionist aspirations have been a part of RDoC from the beginning. Rather than reductionism, a more problematic tenet of the RDoC initiative is a contempt for the categories of the DSM, seen in a tendency to blame the lack of progress on adherence to a categorical model rather than on the intrinsic complexity of psychopathology.One aspect of this complexity is the open nature of psychological concepts.Turning to the “neural circuit” metaphor, Zachar suggests that the notion of a “circuit for” may reflect adopting too modular a theory of mind, which as a framework, may unnecessarily constrain a mechanistic science.