The internal aspect of learning is something that the existing literature has not investigated in detail. A range of examples are investigated in this chapter, with the first section addressing Belarusian and Russian learning from the Soviet Union. Then the chapter analyses how Putin learnt from his image failure after the sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine in the early 2000s. The Kursk sinking led to a significant change in image with Putin becoming a macho-man. The 2009 Moldovan Twitter Revolution led to learning after the protest on the part of the nominally pro-European government and the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan provided learning opportunities for Ukrainian governments. The chapter then addresses sub-optimal legislation in Belarus and Russia and potential learning from the failure. Learning from failure has not been investigated too much in the existing literature and this chapter addresses the issue.

The chapter addresses examples of learning from external failure, firstly ascertaining Chinese learning from the collapse of the Soviet Union. It then addresses case learning from three revolutions: the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan in Ukraine and the Arab Spring from across the North African and Middle East region. The three protests led to learning on the part of Belarus and Russia in particular. The Orange Revolution directly contributed to preventive counter-revolutions in Belarus and Russia. The collapse of authoritarian regimes across the Middle East and North Africa led to rapid learning from Belarus and Russia. The Euromaidan saw clear learning from Belarus and Russia, but also from Moldova. However, evidence of Moldovan learning is limited, and the chapter highlights that external learning is limited regarding Moldova and Ukraine.

After 1999, Ukraine and Russia both slid toward autocracy. As Leonid Kuchma’s autocracy made him a less fit partner for the West, he moved closer to Russia, and Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election looked set to solidify Russia’s position in Ukraine. The overturning of that rigged election via the Orange Revolution shocked the Russian leadership. In addition to snatching defeat from the jaws of victory in Ukraine, revolution now appeared to threaten the Putin regime. By merging the Ukraine–Russia conflict with the growing Russia–West conflict, this episode made both harder to solve.

The Orange Revolution initially appeared as a victory for democracy in Ukraine and as a geopolitical victory for the West. Those two ideas – democratic revolution and geopolitics – became tightly linked in the eyes of Russian leaders, but whereas western thinkers saw democracy as fostering peace, Russia saw it as a weapon. The Orange Revolution also made Ukraine appear to be the fulcrum of security dilemma politics in central Europe. Both Russia and the West saw the other’s designs on Ukraine as threatening their security and as undermining the status quo. Meanwhile, the Orange Revolution fizzled, Viktor Yanukovych made a remarkable comeback, and Russia reasserted itself, bolstered by Putin’s popularity and by booming energy prices.

The Orange Revolution initially appeared as a victory for democracy in Ukraine and as a geopolitical victory for the West. Those two ideas – democratic revolution and geopolitics – became tightly linked in the eyes of Russian leaders, but whereas western thinkers saw democracy as fostering peace, Russia saw it as a weapon. The Orange Revolution also made Ukraine appear to be the fulcrum of security dilemma politics in central Europe. Both Russia and the West saw the other’s designs on Ukraine as threatening their security and as undermining the status quo. Meanwhile, the Orange Revolution fizzled, Viktor Yanukovych made a remarkable comeback, and Russia reasserted itself, bolstered by Putin’s popularity and by booming energy prices.

After 1999, Ukraine and Russia both slid toward autocracy. As Leonid Kuchma’s autocracy made him a less fit partner for the West, he moved closer to Russia, and Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election looked set to solidify Russia’s position in Ukraine. The overturning of that rigged election via the Orange Revolution shocked the Russian leadership. In addition to snatching defeat from the jaws of victory in Ukraine, revolution now appeared to threaten the Putin regime. By merging the Ukraine-Russia conflict with the growing Russia-West conflict, this episode made both harder to solve.