Following the introduction of the one-child policy in China, the capital-labor ratio of China increased relative to that of India, while FDI/GDP inflows to China versus India simultaneously declined. These observations are explained in the context of a simple neoclassical overlapping generations paradigm. The adjustment mechanism works as follows: the reduction in the growth rate of the (urban) labor force due to the one-child policy increases the capital per worker inherited from the previous generation. The resulting increase in China’s domestic capital-labor ratio thus "crowds out" the need for foreign direct investment (FDI) in China relative to India. Our paper is a contribution to the nascent literature exploring demographic transitions and their effects on FDI flows.

Empirical evidence suggests that close to 100 million women are “missing” worldwide. We revisit the empirical evidence for China, the country with the most missing women. Nearly ten million girls born in the 1980s and 1990s who were “missing” according to earlier census data can be found again in the 2010 population census. We discuss two possible explanations for the re-emergence of these formerly missing girls: the delayed registration of girls owing to economic reasons, and the response to amendments to the Chinese Statistics Law in 2009 and policy changes in the 2010 population census. Using the most recent statistics, we document patterns of the underreporting of women over time and across regions as well as explore the basic determinants of underreporting of women. Important policy challenges remain. For the unregistered children, the lack of access to public services will increase their vulnerability and adversely affect their quality of life.

This paper studies the effects of China’s one-child policy on human capital and income. I build and calibrate a quantitative OLG model with intergenerational transfers. The model generates a quantity–quality trade-off, so a restriction on fertility leads to an increase in human capital, and higher human capital then contributes to higher individual income and welfare. Calibrating the model to match survey data on urban households, I find that the one-child policy increases the human capital of affected agents by about 47% relative to a counterfactual with no fertility restrictions. However, the effect on aggregate income is negative as the size of the labor force falls.

Did growing up as singletons (only-children) convince young adults born under China's one-child policy of the superiority of singleton status and therefore the desirability of not having more than one child? This article draws on interviews with 52 childless newlyweds in Dalian, China, to help answer this question. We found that far from convincing them of the superiority of singleton status, the feelings of loneliness experienced by singletons in childhood and adulthood have convinced most of them that it is better to have a sibling than to be a singleton and thus it is better to have two children instead of one. Moreover, interviewees who did have siblings tended to corroborate singletons’ beliefs about how valuable a sibling can be in both childhood and adulthood.

This study examined the association between adult children's achievements and ageing parents’ depressive symptoms in China. The research topic was examined within the contexts of one-child and multiple-children families in rural and urban China. Older adults (aged 60–113, N = 8,450; nested within 462 communities/villages) from the 2013 China Longitudinal Ageing Social Survey provided information about themselves and their adult children (N = 22,738). Adult children's achievements were assessed with educational attainment, financial status and occupational status; older parents’ depressive symptoms were assessed with nine items of the Chinese version of the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale. Multilevel linear regression models were estimated separately for older parents with one child only and multiple children. For older parents with multiple children, both having one or more children with any achievement and the total number of children's achievements were associated with fewer depressive symptoms. For parents with only one child, any achievement of the child and the total number of the child's achievements were associated with fewer depressive symptoms. Our results also indicated that the association between children's achievements and parents’ depressive symptoms varied by rural–urban residence and family type. Our findings contributed to the understanding of family dynamics underlying the emotional wellbeing of older adults in China.

The Chinese Communist Party government has been forcefully promoting its jihua shengyu (planned fertility) program, known as the “one-child policy,” for more than three decades. A distinctive authoritarian model of population governance has been developed. A pertinent question to be asked is whether China’s one-child policy and the authoritarian model of population governance have a future. The answer must be no; they do not. Although there are many demographic, economic, and social rationales for terminating the one-child policy, the most fundamental reason for opposing its continuation is drawn from ethics. The key ethical rationale offered for the policy is that it promotes the common social good, not only for China and the Chinese people but for the whole human family. The major irony associated with this apparently convincing justification is that, although designed to improve living standards and help relieve poverty and underdevelopment, the one-child policy and the application of the authoritarian model have instead caused massive suffering to Chinese people, especially women, and made them victims of state violence. A lesson from China—one learned at the cost of individual and social suffering on an enormous scale—is that an essential prerequisite for the pursuit of the common good is the creation of adequate constraints on state power.