We study zero-sum optimal stopping games (Dynkin games) between two players who disagree about the underlying model. In a Markovian setting, a verification result is established showing that if a pair of functions can be found that satisfies some natural conditions then a Nash equilibrium of stopping times is obtained, with the given functions as the corresponding value functions. In general, however, there is no uniqueness of Nash equilibria, and different equilibria give rise to different value functions. As an example, we provide a thorough study of the game version of the American call option under heterogeneous beliefs. Finally, we also study equilibria in randomized stopping times.

In optimal stopping problems in which the player is free to choose the order of observation of the random variables as well as the stopping rule, it is shown that in general there is no function of all the moments of individual integrable random variables, nor any function of the first n moments of uniformly bounded random variables, which can determine the optimal ordering. On the other hand, several fairly general rules for identification of the optimal ordering based on individual distributions are given, and applications are made to several special classes of distributions.