Human rights/dignity can be grounded in Buddhism as part of the freedom of human beings to liberate themselves from suffering. But there are markedly different approaches to this freedom in various Buddhisms. In early Buddhism, dignity can be seen as a worth that arises intrinsically due to the ability of each individual to free oneself from suffering. In Nishitani Keiji’s philosophy of Zen, dignity is an ability to free everyone from an ontologically shared suffering, as in Thich Nhat Hanh’s engaged Buddhism. Next, the chapter examines two very common forms of Buddhism that are often neglected in rights/dignity discourses – salvific Buddhism (Pure Land) and Confucian Buddhism. In Tanabe Hajime’s view of salvific Buddhism, “dignity”is not about attaining freedom oneself but about one’s being saved by absolute other power and being a mediator for that salvation. In Watsuji Tetsurō’s Confucian Buddhism, dignity is seen as the potential to be free from one’s egotism for the sake of serving one’s community. All of these show markedly different moral approaches to human dignity – and Sueki Fumihiko warns us not to miss the trans-ethical side of these Buddhisms.

In “Remarks on Nishida and Nishitani,” Rorty examines Kyoto School philosophers Nishida Kitaro and Nishitani Keiji in relation to the pragmatist tradition. Characterizing their epistemological orientations as the “Argument from Holism to Monism,” Rorty likens their perspectives to the idealism of T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Josiah Royce. He then contrasts those perspectives with the “Argument from Holism to Pragmatism” advanced by William James and John Dewey. He concludes by embracing those aspects of Nishida’s and Nishitani’s positions that are consistent with pragmatism’s “democratic humanism,” but rejecting their traces of transcendence, all while offering one of the more concise accounts of his classical and neopragmatist commitments.