This chapter recounts the final years of the USSR, from the collapse of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe in 1989 to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991. It focuses particularly on Gorbachev's failed bid to create a common European space that would include the USSR. His effort to keep East Germany out of NATO was a significant part of that vision, but it was outrightly rejected by President George H.W. Bush, who feared that if Gorbachev had his way, Germany would leave NATO, undermining the alliance and, with it, the rationale for the American presence in Europe. The chapter explores the nature of the reassurances given to Gorbachev in February 1990, concluding that there was never a "deal" not to enlarge NATO, at least not as far as Gorbachev knew. Facing economic collapse and political chaos at home, the Soviet leader had to accept the terms he was given. This did not save the Soviet project. Gorbachev's vision for the future fell flat, leaving his dreams of global leadership largely unfulfilled.

The United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower from the embers of the Cold War’s end, without, however, a wholesale reformulation of the principles and tools used to execute US grand strategy. This was particularly true in Europe, where the United States remained engaged politically, economically, and military; retained significant numbers of forward-deployed forces; and orchestrated the continuation and eventual expansion of NATO. For the United States, and for many Europeans, continued American dominance after 1991 of the continent’s security through NATO was a logical outgrowth of what Washington had provided in the West after 1945. Even within the context of America’s leadership of NATO, alternative strategies to the ultimate path of NATO’s post-1999 enlargement were possible. These included the Partnership for Peace, initially seen as an alternative to NATO enlargement formulated by the Pentagon; some enlargement of NATO to the east, but not as much as occurred; and a concrete path for Russia to join the alliance. This chapter considers the pros and cons of each of these alternatives to the NATO enlargement policy chosen by the United States and its partners in order to provide a more detailed assessment of the policy than has existed previously.

Argues that despite hopes of sweeping change, Clinton ended up running a traditional, Cold War–style foreign policy. He used Cold War institutions like NATO, and acted to contain Russian power in the Balkans. Examines attempts to apply a Clinton Doctrine and its successes and failures. Argues that Clinton's interventions advanced a trend of wars of Muslim liberation.