Sickness insurance companies were developed in Spain by doctors and healthcare professionals, remaining outside the interests of general insurance companies. Their management was hardly professional, with limited actuarial techniques and they only accounted for a small percentage of total insurance business premiums. From the 1970s onwards, various factors changed this situation, driving processes of concentration, with numerous takeovers and mergers, first reducing the number of local and regional companies to the benefit of companies of national scope. Subsequently, the growth in demand for this type of coverage sparked the interest of national general insurance companies and multinationals, leading to a restructuring of the sector which has progressively acquired greater weight within the insurance business and become increasingly internationalised. This last stage immersed the health sector in Spain in the great processes of globalisation of the sector, characterised by a financialisation of capital promoted by the bank investment funds. These processes are little known and are the focus of analysis of this paper, with the aim of enabling comparison at international level.

The City of London has long attracted much academic and popular attention. However, little research has been done on the relationship between the City and the European Economic Community in the 1970s and 1980s, despite the accession of the United Kingdom in 1973. Based on archival material from central and commercial banks in the UK and France, this article explores the relationship between the City and the EEC, from the accession of the UK to the EEC in 1973 to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which was meant to be the year of the completion of the single financial market. The article explores two areas: the influence of the City on EEC financial regulation, and how this influence was exerted. It pays particular attention to two committees chaired by the Bank of England, the City Liaison Committee and the City EEC Liaison Committee, and to British banks. The article argues that if the EEC played a part in the formalisation of British banking regulation, the City also played a key role in shaping EEC plans for financial regulation.

Before banks rose to dominate credit markets, ordinary people raised credit themselves or through alternative intermediaries. However, obtaining a comprehensive overview of the size and functioning of the non-bank segments within the credit market has been a great challenge for historians. Notarial deeds are widely available, but typically shed light on the borrowing of relatively well-to-do members of society. Probate inventories and insolvency records do provide insight into the modest loans of ordinary people, but only haphazardly and not for the overall stock of loans. This article exploits an exogenous shock, the Discipline Act introduced in the Netherlands in 1856, which forced lenders to record all unredeemed loans they had provided to a particular group of borrowers: seafarers. The c.14,000 loans that were recorded, in combination with several additional sources, provide a unique insight into the overall size, composition and functioning of a particular segment of the non-bank credit market.

The literature on internationalisation processes in family businesses has boomed with the emergence of new approaches and different perspectives. One of these schemes analyses the so-called born-again global firms, mostly technology companies, which experienced an internationalisation process after one or more serious incidents affecting it. The case of Ines Rosales extends the frontier of the meaning of a global born-again firm to firms in industries and traditional products. One of its most striking aspects is that the flagship product is centennial and based on basic ingredients. In addition, the production process of the firm mix production by hand and mechanised developments. Inés Rosales shows the ability of a family Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) in a process of internationalisation even in culturally distant markets through the traditional cake of olive oil.

In 2010 Spain ranked second among EU-15 countries in the manufacture of passenger cars; however, in 1950 the country’s car production had been purely symbolic. Taking as its starting point the trajectories of the enterprises that have shaped the auto industry in Spain, this study explores the sector’s process of development within the interpretative framework proposed by Alfred D. Chandler in Scale and Scope. Until the mid-1970s, SEAT and FASA-Renault, the sector’s first-movers, maintained their position as industry leaders. The entry of Ford and GM in the 1970s was to restructure the industry as it shifted its focus towards exportation to the European Economic Community. Both market share and net profits are used as indicators of the evolution of each car maker.

We employ a panel data research design to examine the determinants of investment returns in the Swedish property fire insurance industry from 1903 to 1939 – a period of great economic and political uncertainty. Contrary to expectations, we find that mutual fire insurers generated systematically higher investment returns than stock fire insurers. Investment returns are inversely related to leverage but positively related to liquidity, showing that firms adopting a more precautionary investment strategy attain higher returns.

Because the literature of European economic history has paid little attention to traditional electricity systems, the interest in studying Fensa lies in analysing the different types of companies, which helped to shape the development of the Spanish electricity sector prior to its present oligopolistic structure. This case provides insight into two issues. First, we learn about the behaviour of the second-generation companies (those that based their production on a controlled hydropower regime), which, despite their limited size, made their commercial specialisation (supplying the dynamic industrial market of Guipúzcoa) their main comparative advantage. Second, we analyse the behaviour of those companies which at this time, as distribution companies and/or subsidiaries of the large Spanish companies (Iberduero), were an instrument of the policy of integrating regional markets.

This article analyses the origin of the persistently high level of electricity prices that hampered the expansion of electricity consumption during the interwar period in Porto. Initially, the rent-seeking behaviour of both the supply firm and the City Hall at the local level affected the expansion of the local electricity market. During the 1930s, this collusion at municipal level coincided with unpredictable energy policies at state level. This circumstance impeded the indispensable increase of scale and the building of a regional market of electricity in north Portugal. The literature on regulation and institutional analysis has proved very useful. Finally, though equally important, primary sources from company archives and institutional bodies were also employed.

This paper analyses the role played by the National Commission for Industrial Productivity (CNPI) in the development of the Spanish footwear industry. First the nature of the Commission is reviewed highlighting its links with the «americanisation» campaign that took place in post-war Europe. Then, it is shown that footwear was one of the priority sectors for the CNPI, and the main initiatives developed by the organism in this industry in the years prior to the take off of exports are expounded. In third place, it is shown that the sector had already undergone a profound «americanisation» in Spain and in Europe in general during the first third of the 20th century. Lastly, the paper attempts to assess the effective repercussion of the CNPI's actions.

This article examines some effects of the political and military alliance between Spain and the United States on the Spanish business community in the 1950s and 1960s. The technical aid is taken to be the set of official programs and private contracts and investments that helped disseminate in Spain the techniques and ideas associated with the American model. The articulation process of the economic interests of the United States in Spain is quantitatively and qualitatively analysed. Our research reveals that technical aid and the pro-American circles formed around it, which were partially based on existing business relations, were essential to such process. The Spanish case shows therefore, first, that US foreign economic policy favoured, even if only indirectly, American business during the Cold War. Second, this work provides material and ideas to analyse the Spanish «miracle» as a rather exogenous growth process.

This article analyses the industrial activity of the French automobile company Renault during its first two decades in Spain. A first section examines the negotiations which concluded in the concession of the Spanish license and the establishment of a Spanish licensee society (FASA). A second part analyses the early years of FASA, in which it experienced a sustained growth overshadowed by product quality and management problems. We show how FASA's main phase of expansion coincided with the French head office's control, effective from 1964 on. The last part of the article summarizes some of the factors contributing to the success of Renault in Spain: such as adapting to local market conditions, establishing a certain degree of freedom in management and a more flexible export policy.

This article shows the first results of a research project that attempts to analyse the relations between the business groups, the institutional framework and the economic development in 20th century Spain. It employs a microeconomic perspective, a historical-institutional analysis and private archival sources. The article focuses on the businesses of the Aznar family from 1937 (when they took over the management of the firms that formerly belonged to the Sota and Aznar group) to 1983 (when Naviera Aznar, the most important firm of the group, broke out and ceased business). Out of this empirical evidence, the article tries to underline the consequences that an industrial organization based on business groups and on an institutional framework characterized by the State's extreme interventionism and discretionality had on the capabilities and the competitiveness of Spanish firms and industries, and, by extension, on the economic development of Spain during the Franco's regime and the first Governments of the transition to democracy.