A century ago the US commercial banking system was exceptional in two ways. It was by good measure the largest commercial banking system of any country. And it was different from the commercial banking systems of other leading countries in having tens of thousands of independent banks with very few branches rather than the more typical pattern of a far smaller number of banks with many branches. Today, a century later, the US system is more normal than exceptional, dominated by a small number of very large banks with extensive branch systems. This article describes the US banking-structure transition from exceptional to normal. It closes with an interesting contrast of US and European banking developments.

Farley Grubb's recent article in the Financial History Review contains econometric results designed to support his theoretical propositions concerning the paper money of the American colonies. This comment demonstrates that some of his results are spurious and the rest are based on using incorrect testing procedures and incorrect critical values of test statistics.

I reconstitute the spending obligations and revenue sources of colonial New Jersey's provincial government for the years 1704 through 1775 from primary sources using forensic accounting techniques. I identify and analyze the methods for raising revenue to meet normal peacetime and emergency wartime expenses. I calculate the provincial tax burdens imposed on New Jersey's citizens. I identify how Britain interfered with New Jersey's fiscal structure. I estimate what the revenues and tax burdens would have been without this interference. New Jersey paid for war expenses by issuing bills of credit, spreading the tax burden of redeeming these bills into the future. New Jersey paid its yearly administrative costs with current property taxes and with current interest earnings from loaning paper money. In the absence of British interference and wars, New Jersey could have driven tax burdens to zero by using interest earnings to pay for all its provincial administrative costs.

Before the Revolution American colonies issued paper money known as ‘bills of credit’. The bills issued in the Middle colonies held their value surprisingly well despite large wartime fluctuations in the quantity issued, but those issued in New England depreciated as the quantity in circulation increased. The bills' stable purchasing power in the Middle colonies has often been attributed to the redemption provisions enacted when the bills were issued. Similar provisions in New England supposedly failed because New England failed to enforce them. This article explores the comparative enforcement of redemption provisions in the two regions, and in New York in particular, and concludes that differential enforcement does not explain the disparity between the New England experience and that in the Middle colonies.

To investigate the link between monetary reforms and prices on the art market, this article focuses on the aftermath of the Gutt plan, a monetary purge implemented in Belgium just after World War II. On the basis of an original database of close on 3,000 artworks sold between 1945 and 1951, this article shows that, following the implementation of the Gutt plan, real prices on the art market experienced a massive drop suggesting that real prices on the art market are significantly influenced by money supply.

La théorie de la banque centrale analyse la hiérarchisation bancaire dans le cadre du monopole d'émission de billets de banque. Or sous le régime de la liberté bancaire dans lequel les banques peuvent émettre des billets et des dépôts à vue sans restrictions quantitatives ou autres, la structure bancaire converge également vers la hiérarchisation. L'émergence d'une banque supérieure intervenant en tant que prêteur en dernier ressort est alors un phénomène spontané et constitue une innovation du système de paiement afin d'endiguer les ruées de remboursement, et non une création du législateur ou une conséquence de la réglementation. Afin d'établir un système bancaire rigoureusement décentralisé, c'est-à-dire sans banque supérieure, les chambres de compensation doivent respecter des règles très strictes leur interdisant de créer de la monnaie supérieure. Sans ces règles et sans cette intervention du législateur, la structure hiérarchisée du système bancaire est alors définitive.