The tumultuous period of the nationalisation of Iran’s oil industry during the tenure of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, which began with its approval in 1951 and concluded with the signing of the consortium agreement in 1954, serves as the focus of the present analysis. This brief, full-scale nationalization, lasting only three years, was characterised by significant and decisive changes, including the bloody strike of March 1951 and the coup in August 1953. Following the coup, the nationalisation efforts were effectively terminated, and a year later, a new agreement was signed with a consortium of major oil companies, where the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, now renamed British Petroleum, held a 40 per cent stake. The primary focus of this research is the impact of nationalisation on the lives and work of the oil industry’s workers during this period. It questions whether Mosaddeq’s government was able to implement fundamental improvements in the workers’ conditions in such a short timeframe. Additionally, it explores the forms of workers’ support for the nationalisation of the oil industry and investigates why the workers, who had previously engaged radically in the bloody strikes of 1946 and 1951, were absent from the political scene during the 1953 coup.

The conclusion of the Second World War marked a significant turning point in global dynamics, particularly evidencing the decline of British global supremacy. Economic crises engendered by the war, coupled with the political repercussions of Indian independence, accelerated the dissolution of the British Empire. One salient indicator of this decline was Iran’s decisive move toward the nationalisation of its oil industry, a pivotal moment extensively analysed in this chapter. The Labour government in Britain, assuming power at the war’s end, aimed to revise its policies to maintain its monopoly in the Iranian oil sector by improving workers’ conditions. However, these efforts proved too limited and belated to effectively counter the rapid political developments in Iran, ultimately leaving Britain without a favourable strategic position in the Iranian context. The narrative then shifts to explore the working and living conditions within the Iranian oil industry in the late 1940s, highlighting the increasing poverty, entrenched housing, and health problems. It also examines the oil company’s response to the emerging labour movement and delves into the workers’ role in the nationalisation process. Additionally, the discussion encompasses the broader impacts of the withdrawal of British experts from Iran, focusing on the long-term effects on the lives and work of industry employees. These events significantly shaped the socio-economic landscape of the region and influenced the global power structures in the post-war era.

This book brings together diplomatic and social history to narrate the history of US–Iranian relations. It argues that cultural openness and cooperation brought benefits not only to America and Iran, but the region more generally. The rift in US–Iranian relations had to do with more than the Mosaddeq coup or the dramatic shift in Iranian politics after 1979. Iran was confronted with competing nationalisms along its borders that forced Iran to adopt a defensive posture. Finally, America and Iran operated on both elite and non-elite networks that showed the ways in which social divisions affected diplomacy.