This chapter examines the evolution of Soviet foreign policy from Stalin's death in 1953 until the 1956 Suez Crisis. It begins with a discussion of the power struggle in the Soviet leadership, which led to the arrest and execution of Lavrentii Beria. Beria, as well as his rivals in leadership, briefly explored prospects for detente with the West, including by effectively giving up on socialism in East Germany. By 1955, when Nikita Khrushchev consolidated power in his hands, such prospects faded for two reasons. First, the nuclear revolution emboldened Khrushchev, eliminating the need for concessions to the West. Second, decolonization in the “third world” opened new horizons for the Soviet leader as he embraced opportunities to project Soviet influence to remote shores, seeking a clientele and – through their recognition of Soviet greatness – a form of revolutionary legitimacy. The chapter offers an in-depth analysis of Khrushchev's bromance with Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and an overview of the consequences of the Suez Crisis for Soviet foreign policy.

This chapter discusses Stalin's intentions and actions in the second half of 1945, and how they contributed to the Cold War. The chapter argues that Stalin did not have plans for turning the world red and instead looked forward to a prolonged period of great power cooperation after the war. Stalin was willing to give up opportunities for advancing Soviet influence, for power without legitimacy was insecure power. Legitimacy required external, especially American, recognition. Stalin had no one-fit-all solution for projecting Soviet influence; his arsenal included anything from outright annexation to indirect control through Communist-dominated coalition governments. The chapter contends that Stalin was determined to resist perceived American pressure, not least during the ill-fated London Conference of Foreign Ministers (September 1945), believing that concessions under pressure implied weakness. That was especially true now that the United States had the A-bomb, which gave Washington huge leverage in talking to Stalin from a position of strength.