This chapter moves to the last phases of the French occupation in parts of Germany and to the improved position of the local Jews in these regions. It then concentrates on the efforts to legalize Jewish equality in the constitution of the new German Bund, discussed in a special committee at the Congress of Vienna, and within this context, it examines the position of a number of important German politicians towards Jewish emancipation. While Wilhelm von Humboldt’s liberal approach is relatively well known, but appears to be more complex on taking a closer look, it is interesting to observe the position of another Prussian politician, Karl August von Hardenberg, and especially that of the Austrian foreign minister chairing the entire congress, Metternich. Both were much more conservative, but still supported Jewish equality, insisting it must apply to Germany as a whole. In the end, this question remained undecided, like so many other issues relating to the planned constitution, mainly because of the pressure from the presumably much more liberal bourgeoisie in the various cities of the new Bund.

Occurring at the mid-point in Napoleon’s imperial career, the Franco-Austrian War of 1809, or the War of the Fifth Coalition, highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the French emperor and his army as well as the beginnings of improvements among their foes. Austria, driven by a desire to avenge previous defeats and hoping to take advantage of Napoleon’s distraction in Spain, opened hostilities by invading Napoleon’s ally Bavaria, but the French emperor hastened to the theater of war, quickly seized the initiative and entered Vienna only one month after departing Paris. The ensuing conflict was fought across a vast geographic canvas. Combat in the principal theater, the Danube valley, featured Napoleon’s first undeniable repulse at Aspern-Essling (21–22 May), the second largest battle of the entire epoch at Wagram (5–6 July) and a surprisingly sudden armistice at Znaim six days later, but the war also encompassed strategically important actions in subsidiary theaters such as Italy, Poland, Hungary, Germany and Holland. It led to Austrian accommodation with France, Napoleon’s marriage to a Habsburg archduchess and eventually to a Franco-Austrian alliance, but it also deepened Franco-Russian suspicions and thus helped set the stage for war in 1812

In the weeks following Napoleon’s monumental defeat at the battle of Leipzig, Coalition forces failed to catch his army as it retreated through Germany and across the Rhine River. Regardless, the Allies decided to launch a comprehensive invasion of France from the North Sea to Switzerland. In late November 40,000 Prussian, British, and Russian troops invaded Holland. One month later, 200,000 Allied soldiers crossed the Upper Rhine to invade Alsace, Switzerland, and Franche-Comté. Shortly after, on New Year’s Day, an additional 75,000 men crossed the Middle Rhine and drove through Lorraine toward the fortress of Metz. By the end of January, Holland and Belgium had fallen, and two Allied armies stood at the Marne and Aube Rivers ready to march on Paris. This circumstance forced Bonaparte to leave his capital and finally assume personal command of the army. After ferocious fighting in February, Napoleon made a daring gamble. To threaten the Coalition’s lifeline across the Rhine, he decided to maneuver against the rear of the main Allied army in the hope of forcing it to withdraw from France. With the French emperor between them and the Rhine River, the Allies took advantage of the open roads to reach Paris. The city surrendered on 31 March. Six days later, Napoleon abdicated unconditionally.

Towards the end of the war against Napoleon, the Allies declared that they were fighting a ‘noble war’, to restore European equilibrium. They presented themselves in stark contrast to Napoleon’s hegemonic ambitions. The Allies agreed on the need to create a ‘just equilibrium’ by curtailing French imperialism, but also harboured imperial ambitions to further their own respective interests in Europe as they negotiated for peace. When the First Treaty of Paris was signed on 30 May 1814, the French constitution was revised to be more liberal. The resulting Charte Constitutionelle, adopted on 4 June 1814, was an important instrument in the fight against terror. Finally, the Congress of Vienna was marked by Napoleon’s return to France: as he marched towards Paris, the Allies confirmed the statutes and treaties that would shape the occupation of France and ensure the ‘safety of Europe’. The final battle against Napoleon saw the Duke of Wellington at the helm of the alliance. The Allied sense of communality and solidarity in the name of Europe’s safety would see Napoleon defeated, but it would also invite tensions and inconsistencies in times of peace and the Allied occupation of France.

In contrast to the largely critical historiography on the Italian portion of the system established at the Congress of Vienna, this chapter argues that most Italians were happy to see the establishment of a Habsburg hegemony, in part as the main driver for reform within the peninsula. Moreover, the major European powers welcomed the Austrians as guarantors of stability in a traditionally contested area, where unrest or international rivalry risked triggering European war. Confronted with Catholic majorities or significant Catholic minorities in most major European states, it was considered crucial within the new climate of collective security to defend the Papacy, while simultaneously encouraging successive Popes to forestall domestic unrest through adopting more progressive politics. The Vienna Settlement in Italy should not be viewed teleologically as a failure, but rather as yet another example of cooperation between states.