The entire outlook of the Middle East changed following the 9/11 attacks, and US–Iran relations were no different. Iran condemned the attacks, citing its own experiences with terrorism, and the first year of the war in Afghanistan surfaced surprising opportunities for cooperation. But in a pivotal State of the Union address, George W. Bush referred to Iran, along with North Korea and Iraq, as part of an Axis of Evil, supporting terrorism and disrupting the global order. The Iranians were incensed and called off the talks on Afghanistan’s new government. The next few years would see heightened rhetoric from both sides and the election of hardline president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Despite his inflammatory policies, he apparently was still open to engagement with the US, if Washington would make the first move. Bush showed no signs of doing so, but with the decline in influence of neoconservative advisers Rumsfeld and Cheney, and the rise to Secretary of State of Condoleezza Rice, the administration made a surprising switch. Again, little of actual substance would develop, but it showed that even as fierce public jabs were exchanged, secret channels still survived.

Chapter 4 examines the 2005 and 2009 elections, which brought conservative hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power. In a similar vein to the previous chapter, it is argued here that, although conservatives stand in opposition to reformists, they are no less secularized than the latter. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the dominant narrative, Ahmadinejad’s 2005 election campaign was not centered on revolutionary values, such as obedience to the Leader, jihad and an ascetic Marxism. While the election was a victory for the conservatives, it did not usher in a return to early revolutionary values. As this chapter will demonstrate, during this period the social and political mindset of Iranians and their values changed tremendously, and domestic politics gradually become indifferent to religion. Significantly, the introduction of televised presidential election debates saw candidates cross many redlines and break many political and religious taboos.

This chapter underscores the utility of a “history from below” approach. Crowd action dispels historical marginalization and state propaganda, making women and men—not states or powerful people—the central agents of history making, and allowing a more nuanced understanding of events. Studying the crowd enables the reader to understand the unique opportunity for mobilization presented by Iran’s 2009 presidential election. The disputed election results prompted a week-long uprising that provoked a crackdown by the state. The chapter outlines how one continuous uprising morphed into many, and how Iran’s political calendar was usurped by the uprising for renewed social movement activity, with the crowd co-opting some of the most politically charged days from Iran’s revolutionary past to evade the security climate and protest the state. Friday sermons, the anniversaries of the US embassy seizure and Ayatollah Beheshti’s assassination, and Student Day, along with revolution-era strategies of action, such as the night-time chants of “Allahu akbar,” all became part of the uprising’s repertoire.

This chapter outlines the history of the 30 years between the Iranian Revolution of 1978‒1979 and the Green Uprisings of 2009, and contextualizes specific days of action that took place in 2009. For example, a brief history of the 1979 US embassy seizure is given to explain the political importance of the Green activists’ day of protest in 2009, when the 30th anniversary of the embassy seizure was used to denounce the Islamic government and its foreign backers. Other subjects covered in the chapter include the post-revolutionary power struggle, the Iran‒Iraq War and its conclusion, the export of the Iranian Revolution, the baby boom, the educational reforms that were designed to create the new Islamist citizen, gender politics, and the reconstruction years when Iran embarked on a period of privatization and development. The chapter explains how the radicals who were ousted from power later returned as reformists in the late 1990s, which prompted a conservative backlash in the form of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, followed in turn by a backlash against the conservatives in 2009 with the candidacy of Mir Hussein Mousavi.