By abandoning the focus on virtue and replacing it with a focus on preservation by means of occasional deception, the Machiavellian discourse throws suspicion on the role of the counsellor, and especially problematises his powerful role in relation to the monarch. This is especially the case in late Tudor England, ruled by monarchs perceived to be ‘weakened’ by their age or gender. Whereas the Henrician humanists had advocated counsellors who ruled their princes, the threat of Machiavellianism and weak monarchs renders such arguments threatening, and the counsellor falls under greater suspicion for his perceived usurpation of power. At the same time – and by contrast – there is a view that such weak monarchs require strong counsel to guide them. If this cannot come from individuals, as they are likely to be self-interested, then it must come different, ‘dis-interested’, sources. Whereas single private counsellors will be self-interested and thus ought not to rule a monarch, especially a female one, assemblies such as parliament will guide the prince according to the good of the commonwealth. For this reason, they need to have a share in the government. Command becomes ‘bridled’ by this source of counsel.

In the Machiavellian literature on counsel, the distinction between private and public prudence becomes more pointed, leading to a distinction between a private sphere ruled by morality, and a public sphere in which moral flexibility, or even amoralism, is appropriate. As Machiavellian principles spread, such a view became accepted even amongst self-described anti-Machiavellians, especially in considering ‘policy’ and political deliberation. Counsellors must weigh both private and public expectations, offering advice that takes into account necessity and advantage politically but with an awareness of traditional expectations, embracing the skill of redescription when occasion, still in the tradition of kairos, calls for the employment of vice. Not only does this redefinition of prudence establish a separate sphere of morality (or lack thereof) for politics, it also introduces a language of contingency and exceptionalism, which becomes associated with the counsellor. In contrast with earlier writings on the topic, in this tradition the counsellor must mitigate not the tyranny of the prince, but of fortune.