Zimbabwe’s longest election season span from the February 2000 referendum to the 2002 presidential election. In 2002, voters became wary and weary of violent elections. Politically motivated violence continued as Mugabe and Tsvangirai had their moment of reckoning as to who should be president of Zimbabwe. Over time, Mugabe become ever more dependent on violence and dictatorial methods, and less and less interested in the welfare of his people, treating Zimbabwe’s wealth and resources as rewards for loyal Zanu PF supporters, boasting that there was no vacancy at State House. A closer study of the incidence of election violence shows voter resilience amidst cyclical bouts of state-sponsored udlakela. Voter resilience in the ruling party and opposition showed the potential and capability of the electorate to recover from crises and shocks. Zimbabwe voter resilience revealed that no matter the number of violent disturbances Zimbabweans absorbed over time, they remained within a relatively similar political state domain without imploding. Voters in Zimbabwe were remarkably resilient, displaying abilities of self-organization under extreme periodic election stresses. They built capacity and adaptation in the face of election adversities without resorting to civil war.

In 2000, udlakela was diverse in its trail, levels, spread and types transforming, and evolving in different ways, in different places and times, and used on different people. The resurgence of violence in 2000 was categorically a response to emboldened opposition as civil society united to mount a spirited stand against Zanu PF autocracy. In September 1999, the ZCTU led by Morgan Tsvangirai in coalition with largely urban-based civic groups collaborated and formed a new opposition party – the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In 1999 and 2000, unprecedented nationwide political violence rocked Zimbabwe, starting during a referendum campaign for the adoption of a long overdue new constitution. The MDC defeated the government after campaigning for a ‘No’ vote in the February 2000 referendum. Held from 12 to 13 February, the result was a majority ‘no vote’. Out of a total of 1,312,738 votes cast, 697,754 were against the draft and 578,210 endorsed it. The draft constitution was rejected by 54.7 per cent against 45.3 per cent on a 26 per cent largely urban turnout. Violence in 2000 was induced by three broad issues: the referendum, land reform and the parliamentary election. These influences and the violence often coalesced but also remained distinct.

Of the states examined in this research, Zimbabwe has the most in-country variation in response to the Kimberley Process. Since a large diamond find in the Marange diamond fields in 2006, Zimbabwe has had five different regulatory strategies in response to the Kimberley Process that are defined in this study. Furthermore, Zimbabwe became a controversial and pivotal case for the Kimberley Process when the government took over the diamond fields in 2008. This led NGOs and other governments to accuse the Zimbabwean state of human rights abuses and complain that the Kimberley Process was too weak to act forcefully in this case. However, while the Zimbabwean state has ignored many other international agreements there has always been at least some effort to stay within the Kimberley Process, thus leading to interesting levels of variation in the government’s strategy toward the process over time. This research argues that variation in regulatory policy in the diamond sector is due to the political economy of factional rivalries within ZANU-PF that have long dominated Zimbabwean politics. In this context the Kimberley Process was heavily politicized and used as an instrument to gain market share.

This chapter explores the manifold ways in which the cholera epidemic became a terrain of polarised political struggles at national and international levels in the areas of humanitarianism, security and governance. This polarisation reached extreme levels. On one hand, the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), along with prominent outside observers – including the International Crisis Group and a high-level panel convened by Physicians for Human Rights – described cholera as the result of ‘the systematic violation of a wide range of human rights’ and evidence of a ‘failing’ state under the stewardship of the ruling party, ZANU(PF). By contrast, elements of the Zimbabwean government decried the outbreak as racist ‘biological warfare’ from the West intended to bring about regime change. Through the allocation of culpability for the cholera outbreak, I argue that a more fundamental political debate about power and legitimacy to govern was taking place as evidenced by international accusations of ‘state failure’ vis-à-vis nationalist claims to ‘state sovereignty’. Furthermore, I argue that this polarisation was deleterious in the extreme because it delayed the humanitarian relief effort, promoted non-engagement between the Zimbabwean and Western governments, and narrowed down the avenues for third-party diplomatic mediation.