Decentralization is believed to ensure better environmental governance. However, recent studies have shown that some governments recentralize local enforcement to increase the effectiveness of policy implementation. Under what conditions is recentralization the better option for environmental enforcement? This study attempts to differentiate two possible mechanisms through which recentralization can deliver better environmental outcomes: curbing elite capture and enhancing local resources. In the context of recentralization reform and with a unique dataset of local investigations into China's environmental enforcement, we demonstrate that although decentralization has been successful from many perspectives, recentralizing local environmental enforcement can produce better outcomes for pollution reduction in China, by curbing local protectionism rather than enhancing local resources. Further qualitative analysis reveals why recentralization cannot necessarily enhance local resources and capacity, even though it is designed to do so.

This article investigates the implementation effects of China's recent reforms to centralize its court system and offers an explanation of why such centralization efforts largely failed. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with judicial personnel from four localities, the study shows that local courts’ structural dependence upon same-level party-states is perpetuated or, in some cases, is even exacerbated, despite the unprecedented reform plans to centralize the budgetary and personnel management of the judicial system. Further investigation finds that, contrary to what existing assessments suggest, implementation failure is less a result of regional disparities in resources than of the party-state's own reliance on its horizontal line of power concentration and hierarchy, which is a core feature of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) one-party rule and hinders the party-state's own attempts to strengthen both judicial autonomy and centralization. The article thus challenges two extant notions on recent political-legal developments in China – that the CCP regime has substantially centralized its judiciary along the vertical line, and that judicial autonomy can continue to increase and manifest both under the conditions of, and serving the purpose of, deepening one-party authoritarianism.

The recent proliferation of China's railways has posed challenges to the dominance of the national-level railway authority on railway development. Since the 2000s, the planning of new railways has evolved into a politics of scale in which actors across multiple scales of government have bargained over railway alignment and station siting for their respective interests. This politics is shaped by the uneven bargaining powers of the contending state agents over railway planning. Interscalar division of regulatory oversight over strategic resources for railway development enables state agents at some scales to bargain more successfully, whereas variations in administrative and economic standing further differentiate the interscalar bargaining powers of municipal governments. Different results of bargaining across scales for each city have produced, as intercity railway planning in the Pearl River Delta illustrates, significant intercity variations in average travel times to the stations for the new railways that these cities share. Owing to the peculiar scalar distribution of the costs and benefits of the new railways, municipal governments with greater bargaining power have, contrary to traditional wisdom, bargained for less accessibility to intercity railway stations.

In an effort to fight against local protectionism in court enforcement proceedings, China's Supreme People's Court (SPC) promulgated its “Notice on relevant issues pertaining to the people's court handling foreign and foreign-related arbitration” in 1995. Pursuant to this Notice, all Intermediate People's Courts have to report to the SPC and obtain its approval for any decision not to enforce a foreign or foreign-related arbitral award. However, the effectiveness of this internal reporting mechanism in constraining local protectionism has never been empirically tested. This study is based on 98 publicly available non-enforcement reply opinions rendered by the SPC after lower courts have made and reported preliminary non-enforcement decisions. It analyses whether these non-enforcement decisions show any pattern of local protectionism. Statistical results do not suggest that local protectionism is a major barrier hindering effective enforcement of foreign or foreign-related arbitral awards in China. We therefore contend that this internal reporting system may serve other functions by providing an alternative tool to reinforce judicial oversight in spite of China's weak appellant system. At the same time, the Chinese government seems to rely on this internal reporting system to achieve important policy goals. In this sense, analysing the functionality of this internal reporting system offers insights into this mechanism for top-level judicial control.

This article presents a large-scale, systematic study of politically connected firms in China. It was conducted by compiling a database of all the publicly traded firms in China in 1993, 2002 and 2012 that codes the biographies of hundreds of thousands of board members. I find that there has been a significant increase in the percentage of firms that are connected with the national government in the last 20 years. This casts doubt on a popular argument that businesses in China have primarily relied on “local protectionism.” I interpret this as a result of firms' need to connect with powerful and stable institutions. I test this by examining the impact of the fall of Chen Liangyu on firms in Shanghai.