This article clarifies the intellectual origins of Canadian parliamentary government by situating Confederation within a specific strand of liberal political thought. My argument is that the Fathers of Confederation adhered to the political theory of parliamentarianism. Though liberal constitutionalists, the Fathers of Confederation expressly defended a parliamentary political framework that they considered superior to the American system of checks and balances—one characterized by a powerful elected assembly restrained by an unelected upper house, responsible ministers serving in Parliament, and a constitutional monarch. In elucidating the theory of parliamentarianism that underlies the political project of Confederation, my goal is not only to examine a problem in nineteenth-century Canadian political thought but to ground our current political situation within a larger historical perspective.

In this editorial, we consider the ways in which liberal constitutionalism is challenged by and presents challenges to the climate crisis facing the world. Over recent decades, efforts to mitigate the climate crisis have generated a new set of norms for states and non-state actors, including regulatory norms (emission standards, carbon regulations), organising principles (common but differentiated responsibility) and fundamental norms (climate justice, intergenerational rights, human rights). However, like all norms, these remain contested. Particularly in light of their global reach, their specific behavioural implications and interpretations and the related obligations to act remain debatable and the overwhelming institutionalization of the neoliberal market economy makes clear and effective responses to climate change virtually impossible within liberal societies.

It has been forty years since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initiated the modernization project of Post-Mao China. As with other sectors, learning from the West was one of the basic strategies taken by the CCP to achieve the modernization of Chinese socialist legality, even as Chinese law is meant to be grounded in the orthodoxies of Marxism-Leninism. In order to learn from the West, the CCP generally adopted an elastic and dualistic approach to reform that is based on the utilitarian incentives of Deng Xiaoping. In the political sector, for example, the CCP looked back into the past and the CCP’s successful experiences under Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The aim was to immunize politics from the influence of western liberal-democratic ideology. But in the economic area, the CCP moved toward the West by vigorously adopting advanced western rules and institutions for managing the economy. This article examines how this strategy formed the basic contours of Chinese socialist legality in the past forty years. The article identifies the resulting internal lacuna, especially with respect to the realization of the “rule of law.” This article also analyses the possible future of a Chinese-socialist rule of law. That possibility will be affected by changing external circumstances, particularly the deterioration of China-US relations.

In contrast with the decline of liberal constitutionalism around the world, liberal constitutionalism seems to be resilient in Taiwan. Weaving together several threads of history, law and politics, this article first argues that foreign legal education and identity concerns explain why judicial review and constitutional development more broadly in Taiwan have not only flourished but mirrored both German and American constitutional jurisprudence. Second, it maintains that the case of Taiwan poses another challenge to the concept of global constitutionalism since the number of referenced jurisdictions is quite limited.

The paper deals with the relationship of different types of populism with authoritarianism and constitutionalism. In the first part, I try to define various approaches—Left and Right-Wing, “good” or “bad”—to populism, especially from the point of view of whether they aim at changing the liberal democratic constitutional system to an authoritarian one. The following part discusses the rhetoric of authoritarian populists, which makes this type of populism distinct from non-populist authoritarians. The paper also explores the question of whom to blame for the success of authoritarian populisms, and the final part investigates, whether the use of legal tools by an authoritarian populist to dismantle liberal constitutional democracies means that we can speak about a special populist constitutionalism. While the paper tries to find out the joint characteristics of authoritarian populism, it heavily relies on the Hungarian experiences as a kind of model approach in East-Central Europe and maybe even beyond.

The liberal principle of reciprocity requires that states maintain neutrality with respect to their citizens’ competing comprehensive worldviews (both religious and secular) while officially justifying the law and while adjudicating under it. But the very possibility of such liberal neutrality has come under attack in a post-Enlightenment world in which even foundational arguments for the principle of reciprocity itself are no longer taken for granted. This article offers a pragmatist path to the resolution of this liberal dilemma. It recommends a “default and challenge” model for legal justification and legitimation that is rooted in social-linguistic practice. By rooting justification and legitimation in practice, it is argued liberal neutrality can be preserved without need for appeals to controversial foundational commitments at any level of public political justification. The article closes with a fictional case study concerning abortion to show how politicians and courts can apply this method to preserve liberal neutrality while addressing even the most controversial issues.