This chapter shows how extraterritorial jurisdiction facilitated the coexistence of nationalist and imperialist projects in colonial Egypt. The safeguards proffered by Ottoman-era extraterritoriality had been either adapted to European colonial administrations or cancelled by the early twentieth century. In Egypt, they remained in effect until 1937, playing a formative role when Mussolini announced an aggressively imperialistic project in the Mediterranean in 1933. Cultural institutions, state schools, and Italian consulates became crucial sites of encounter and propaganda dissemination for the regime. Rome’s focus on building a national community coincided with a steady rise in unemployment among Italian subjects. Italians in Egypt became dependent upon Italian state structures just as the they became vital to Rome’s propaganda in the region. Notwithstanding the efforts of the fascist government to convince Egyptian nationalists that Italy’s imperial ambitions posed no territorial threat, the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty set the stage for the end of extraterritoriality and discourse around ’repatriation’ emerged to mitigate tensions between nationalist and imperialist projects.

The subject of this chapter is Grágás, the compilation of the laws of Iceland in the Commonwealth period. The chapter begins by outlining the court structure of Iceland and the fundamentals of legal procedure, briefly discussing the importance of law to the conversion narrative in Íslendingabók and its account of the first decision to put Iceland’s laws into writing. It describes the distinctive concepts and customs which underlie the legal system of medieval Iceland, looking at the role of the búi (neighbour) in legal procedure, and explaining the key concepts of helgi (the right of inviolability), grið (domicile, or household attachment), vígt (the right to kill or to avenge a wrong with impunity), and the problem of dealing with ómagar (dependants). The chapter argues that the laws and sagas are often mutually informing and demonstrates how fundamental an understanding of law is to the interpretation of the Íslendingasögur. It gives numerous examples of how the laws can be used to help elucidate the sagas, and uses the sagas to reveal the importance of law and legal knowledge in medieval Icelandic society.

This book is the result of a collective effort by a group of scholars from Latin America, Europe, and the USA, who together wished to write a legal history that would center on the common experiences of Latin American societies over a long period, which began before Europeans invaded the continent and continue to date. The aim was to identify a narrative that would observe common trends, manifest the dramatic shifts that had occurred throughout this period, and insert these findings into a wider perspective. This in turn would reveal that debates taking place in Latin America were often linked to discussions transpiring elsewhere, to which they both contributed and from which they received input and inspiration. Our first aim, therefore, is to craft a pan-Latin American narrative and insert it into a global perspective. Our second aim is to propose a new methodology that places at the center questions rather than answers, processes rather than results, and contexts rather than descriptions of solutions. We also want to demonstrate the multiple levels on which law operates and how deeply it is embedded in social, political, cultural, and economic processes.

This chapter will use the historical evolution of fiduciary norms in Japan and East Asia to examine the intersection of fiduciary law and transnational legal ordering theory. Various strands of fiduciary notions arrived in East Asia as part of modernization effort beginning in the late nineteenth century. The civilian regulation of conflicted transactions and duty of care was introduced in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as part of Civil Code and Commercial Code, which was followed by statutory introduction of common law trust in early twentieth century, and American corporate governance theory after World War II. Singapore and Hong Kong adopted English common law and equity jurisprudence along with legislations that follow UK and Commonwealth models, which were frequently updated to meet the demands of international financial market. While tensions among common law, civil law, and indigenous norms were conspicuous during the early phases of modernization and reception, more recent decades of globalization have seen greater scale and dynamics of transnational interactions, most notably the rise of UK-style soft law initiative. Throughout the regional history, fiduciary norms have been shaped by shifting colonial pressures and economic hegemony, wars, revolutions, and financial crises, as well as legislative imitation and academic learning. By way of conclusion, this chapter argues that while fiduciary law presents a rich field for exploring process of transnational legal ordering, the theory of transnational legal ordering provides a valuable framework to understand both historical and contemporary evolution of fiduciary law both in individual jurisdictions and across jurisdictional borders.

The relationship between comparative law and legal history has been a topic of interest for a long time. But reflections on how methods could combine the historical approaches of legal systems around the world with theoretical or jurisprudential points of view really began with Edouard Lambert’s 1903 book La fonction du droit civil comparé. Using the two meanings of ‘jurisprudence’ (as case law in French language and as legal theory in English), Lambert proposed comparing positive rules while bearing in mind the weight of history and its limits. Following this path, this chapter explores critical and constructive approaches to comparative law through legal history. In the first part of this chapter, history is used to criticise simplistic conceptions of comparative law like ‘legal families’ and ‘national spirit’. In the second part, historical-jurisprudential approaches are defended as a means of more clearly delimiting legal phenomena and facilitating a deeper analysis of the dynamics of law. In conclusion, scholars are and should remain open to developing a diversity of historical-jurisprudential approaches.

This chapter discusses how a criminal justice system can operate without state input. Conventional wisdom states that the state is an essential aspect of any criminal justice system, based on three assumptions: first, only the state can delineate exactly what acts constitute a crime; second, the purpose of the criminal law is a collective, society-wide statement of condemnation against certain acts; and third, coercion and violence are often used in a criminal justice system and the state has a monopoly on the leigitmate use of force. The chapter rebuts each of these assumptions. First, the chapter notes that, through a combination of natural law and societal mores, there is a consensus on what actions should be considered criminal, even without a state legislature promulgating specific crimes. Second, private responses to criminal activity can further society's goals of deterrence and retribution, even though they also fulfill the needs of the private actors. Third, many responses to criminal activity do not require coercion or force and, even if they do, the state has authorized private uses of force in certain circumstances.

This chapter traces the history of each phase of private law enforcement, from private policing, to private adjudications, to private dispositions (also known as vigilante actions).The chapter points out that, throughout history, private parties have played a larger role in the criminal justice system than most people expected.

The introduction provides an indepth overview of the book's focus, theoretical orientation, critical methodology, significance, originality, and chapter synopisis. It begins by noting that while many analysts may have a sense that accusations initiate criminal matters, neither sociology, history, nor criminal law have focused critical attention on the socio-political forces which first select people to face criminal trials. This is in many the overlooked foundation of criminal law, and state criminalization. In an attempt at redress, examines though socio-political foundations by analyzing (criminal) cases a 'paradigmatic' examples of how criminalization begins. It does so by turning to a unique context and time -- Alberta, Canada circa 1874 –1884 –- where the Dominion of Canada deliberately formed a police force to enforce colonial law. Relying on Wittgenstein and Foucault, and 'law as performance' scholars it indicates how one might approach the idioms, powers, and performances through which pretrial criminal accusations translate social lore into law.