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1 results

  • On learning and the evolutionarily stable strategy

  • W. G. S. Hines, D. T. Bishop
  • Journal:
    Journal of Applied Probability / Volume 20 / Issue 3 / September 1983
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 July 2016, pp. 689-695
    Print publication:
    September 1983

  • In evolutionarily stable strategy models, transmission of one's strategy to one's offspring has routinely been assumed to be exact, whether this transmission is genetic or by instruction. If inexact transmission of strategy is possible, however, the nature of the mode of transmission becomes important. This paper demonstrates analytically that the possibility of learning one's strategy can increase rather than decrease eventual strategy diversity and that the resulting population mean strategy can differ appreciably from an evolutionarily stable strategy. These results are found to be consistent with simulation results reported in the literature.