A regulatory liability-based approach to reducing foodborne illnesses is widely used in the U.S. But how effective is it? We exploit regulatory regime variation across states and over time to examine the relationship between product liability laws and reported foodborne illnesses. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between strict liability with punitive damages and the number of reported foodborne illnesses. We find, however, no statistically significant relationship between strict liability with punitive damages and the number of foodborne illness-related hospitalizations and deaths.

This is the second of two companion papers that discuss accidents caused by robots. In the first paper (Guerra et al., 2021), we presented the novel problems posed by robot accidents, and assessed the related legal approaches and institutional opportunities. In this paper, we build on the previous analysis to consider a novel liability regime, which we refer to as ‘manufacturer residual liability’ rule. This makes operators and victims liable for accidents due to their negligence – hence, incentivizing them to act diligently; and makes manufacturers residually liable for non-negligent accidents – hence, incentivizing them to make optimal investments in R&D for robots' safety. In turn, this rule will bring down the price of safer robots, driving unsafe technology out of the market. Thanks to the percolation effect of residual liability, operators will also be incentivized to adopt optimal activity levels in robots' usage.

In robot torts, robots carry out activities that are partially controlled by a human operator. Several legal and economic scholars across the world have argued for the need to rethink legal remedies as we apply them to robot torts. Yet, to date, there exists no general formulation of liability in case of robot accidents, and the proposed solutions differ across jurisdictions. We proceed in our research with a set of two companion papers. In this paper, we present the novel problems posed by robot accidents, and assess the legal challenges and institutional prospects that policymakers face in the regulation of robot torts. In the companion paper, we build on the present analysis and use an economic model to propose a new liability regime which blends negligence-based rules and strict manufacturer liability rules to create optimal incentives for robot torts.

One explanation for increases in health care costs has been malpractice lawsuits. States have introduced several types of tort reforms to control increases in health care costs. This paper adds to the literature by examining how the differences in joint and several liability (JSL) reforms affect the state-specific growth rate in health care expenditures. Additionally, the paper addresses the potential for a fundamental difference between states that pass different types of liability reforms. The results show that JSL reforms that limit joint liability based on percentage of blame have statistically and economically significant impacts on health care expenditure growth rates.

This paper examines the possibility that insurance for row crops, livestock, and aquaculture can be used effectively to encourage producers to adopt practices that will improve environmental behavior. Examples of agricultural environmental insurance are provided and considered in the context of alternative policy mechanisms. The current state of agricultural insurance and the nonagricultural environmental insurance market are explored. We also lay out the characteristics of an insurable risk along with the theoretical basis of insurance provision. An empirical example of an environmental insurance design is provided, and the behavioral implications of such a design are examined. Finally, we discuss important considerations that should be evaluated when considering an attempt to implement an agricultural insurance program directed at environmental behavior.