Judges are not the first political officials that come to mind when one considers the role of social media in modern politics. Following in the wake of some prominent judicial personalities adopting Twitter, however, a growing number of state high court judges have adopted and established more public personas on the platform. Judges use Twitter in substantively different ways than traditional elected officials (Curry and Fix 2019); however, little is understood about how the use of such social media platforms affects broader judicial networks. Recognizing that judges, like typical social media users, may aspire to expand their networks to build and appeal to broader audiences, we contend that active participation in judicial Twitterverse could yield personal and professional advantages. Here, we address a currently unexplored question: To what extent have judges formed a distinctive “judicial network,” on Twitter, and what discernible patterns present in these networks? Leveraging the unique structure of social media, we collect comprehensive network data on judging using Twitter and analyze what institutional and social factors impact greater power within the judicial network. We find that early adoption, electoral concerns, and connective links between judges all impact the strength of the judicial network, highlighting the complex motivations driving judicial Twitter engagement, and the significance of network building in judges’ social media strategies and its potential impact on career advancement.

Though once commonplace, presidents no longer nominate individuals with legislative experience to the U.S. Supreme Court. What difference does this shift make? Drawing on theories that connect judicial background characteristics to decision-making, I test whether legislative background impacts federal judicial review. Using nonparametric matching and almost 150 years of judicial review decisions, I find that, while such experience decreases the likelihood of striking down a law, the effect is small. By contrast, partisanship has a much stronger impact, with justices more likely to strike down laws when the enacting Congressional majority is a different party from their appointing president.

The story of national judges’ participation in the process of dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) pursuant to Article 267 TFEU is a well-known one. There have been many scholarly efforts to explain and theorize the—lack of—participation of national courts in the mechanism. Indeed, various constitutional, institutional, procedural, cultural, political, and individual factors are pointed out to explain this engagement. Yet, it may come as a surprise that still much remains unknown. The available empirical data concerning the potential causes of the national judges’—non—participation is limited to a number of EU member states and is mostly confined to lower courts judges. It is the aim of this Article to partly fill the void in the literature and to provide novel empirical data gained in the course of semi-structured interviews among judges and court référendaires of three Belgian highest courts. The interviews provide insight into the possible factors driving concerned national judges when deciding (not) to refer preliminary questions, including the role and significance of the obligation to refer which is to be found in Article 267 TFEU and the Cilfit-criteria.

Many court observers have argued that judges are capable of avoiding the use of extraneous factors in decision-making. This study examines the influence of seemingly irrelevant heuristics on real-world courtroom proceedings. Drawing on theories from neighboring disciplines, I hypothesize that physically attractive attorneys have greater success in US federal court. Using a generalizable causal inference strategy and a dataset of over 1,000 cases and 3,000 votes, I find support for my expectations using multiple measures of attractiveness. These findings raise serious normative concerns about equality and underscore the need to adjust traditional models of judicial behavior to account for inherent biases.

Examples abound of Supreme Court justices writing opinions because their ideological preferences or identity characteristics run counter to case outcomes, like when devoted Methodist and Nixon appointee Harry Blackmun wrote the opinion codifying abortion rights in Roe v. Wade (1973). These stories suggest that in some controversial cases, the justices ask such incongruent justices to explain decisions because they believe those justices can underscore an opinion’s legal soundness and increase support for it. Does it work? We asked participants in two survey experiments to read about a pro-abortion or pro-death penalty ruling written by justices of differing ideologies and genders, and then we asked them to respond to the ruling. Their responses indicate that deploying identity-incongruent justices can influence responses, but not the way the justices expect. We find that incongruent opinion writers can reduce partisan differences in support for a Court decision but do not broadly increase public.

Judges who hear multiple cases a day may become exhausted by the time later cases are heard, increasing susceptibility to cognitive depletion, yet the role of workload fatigue in decision-making from hearing cases has rarely been tested in the U.S. One problem is the lack of public data—most U.S. courts do not maintain time-stamped records of case hearings. Using an original dataset of all traffic cases heard in Pulaski County, Arkansas in 2019 and 2020, we examine whether decision fatigue affects case outcomes. We find that charges are less likely to be dismissed in arraignment hearings at the end of a court session than in those at the beginning. This pattern, however, does not hold for trial hearings, suggesting that the effects of fatigue may be context-specific. We suggest policy recommendations to mitigate the effects of decision fatigue in lower courts—courts having the most contact with citizens.

We build upon Brace, Langer, and Hall’s (2000, The Journal of Politics 62: 387–413) original measure of American state supreme court justice ideology – the PAJID scores. To do so, we gather new data on 1,666 state supreme court justices who served between 1970 and 2019 and update the PAJID scores throughout this period. Testing indicates that PAJID scores are a valid measure of state supreme court justices’ policy preferences and compare favorably, though less efficiently, to others such as Bonica and Woodruff (2015, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 31: 472–98) and Windett, Harden, and Hall (2015, Political Analysis 23: 461–9). Given limited data availability for other ideological measures pre-1990 and post-2010, we conclude that these updated PAJID scores should prove attractive to scholars studying state courts during these periods and among those who desire additional state supreme court ideological data for robustness checks.

Do elected judges tailor criminal sentences to the electorate’s ideology? Utilizing sentencing data from North Carolina’s Superior Courts—which transitioned from statewide to local elections in 1996—we study whether judges are obliging to voters’ preferences. We find some evidence of responsiveness: judges from liberal districts were more lenient, while those from moderately conservative districts assigned harsher sentences. Judges from increasingly conservative districts did not change their sentencing patterns, which leads to lower re-election rates. These findings suggest that judges adapt their behavior to retain office, or else they are held accountable by the public.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) uses a chamber system to more efficiently decide cases. To what extent, and under what conditions, does the CJEU’s chamber system undermine the consistency of the Court’s application of EU law? This paper contributes to the literature on the internal organization of collegial courts by presenting a computational formal model that predicts (a) that hearing cases in smaller chambers undermines the consistency of the Court’s application of EU law and (b) that the magnitude of this effect is larger when judges’ preferences are more heterogeneous and smaller when plaintiffs strategically bring cases. Based on these findings, I use machine learning and empirical data on CJEU judgments in infringement cases to estimate the degree to which we should expect the chamber system to undermine the consistency of the CJEU’s application of EU law in practice.

This article presents the CJEU Database Platform, which provides scholars with an extensive collection of easily accessible, research-ready data on the the universe of cases, decisions, and judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The CJEU Database Platform provides a foundation for the broader CJEU Database currently being developed by The IUROPA Project, a multidisciplinary group of scholars researching judicial politics in the European Union (EU). In this article, we illustrate how the CJEU Database Platform opens the door to new areas of theoretical and empirical research on judicial politics in the EU.

Using data from nearly 5,000 votes cast by more than 400 judges in courts of last resort from all 50 states, we investigate whether there is a relationship between a state's judicial retention method and the likelihood that a judge votes to join a precedent-overturning majority. We find that relative to judges retained by institutions such as judicial commissions or state legislatures, those retained via either partisan or retention elections are significantly more likely to join majorities that overturn precedent. Most of this effect is due to behavior in high-profile cases that garner media attention. We find little evidence that an impending election moderates these effects. Finally, we find no evidence that judges retained via nonpartisan elections treat precedent differently than their institutionally retained colleagues.

Why do some people evaluate state supreme courts as more legitimate than others? Conventional academic wisdom suggests that people evaluate courts in nonpartisan ways, and that people make a distinction between how they evaluate individual court decisions and how they evaluate the court's legitimacy more broadly. We challenge this idea by arguing that people's partisan identities have a strong influence on how people evaluate the impartiality of courts, just as they do other aspects of the political world. Using original survey experiments, validated by existing observational survey data, we show that people perceive state supreme courts as being more impartial when courts issue decisions that match the ideological preferences of their preferred political party, while court decisions at odds with their party's policy goals diminish people's belief that courts are impartial arbiters of the law. We also show that the effects of citizen perceptions of impartiality erode evaluations of state court legitimacy, which makes them want to limit the independence of judicial institutions.

American state constitutions vary tremendously in their length, amendment rate, and age. These three variables—especially the first two—strongly influence the rate at which state supreme courts strike down state actions for violating the state constitution. Longer, more detailed constitutions reduce policy flexibility, increasing judicial invalidations; rarely updated constitutions may fail to address modern concerns, increasing invalidations; and recently adopted constitutions may contain fragile logrolls and similar shortcomings, also increasing invalidations. These findings add new considerations to a rich literature on judicial review in state supreme courts.

Most state supreme court justices have time-bound terms that require them to be reappointed or reelected after a certain amount of time. In three American states, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia, the legislature has the sole power to retain justices. Legislatures, and their specialized judiciary committees, are well positioned to monitor judicial behavior and can reject retention for justices who are unacceptable. This turns the legislature's oversight authority into influence over policy making by justices who still need to be reappointed to additional terms. But some justices (co-partisans) are insulated from this influence by their connections to the majority party, which substantially increases the likelihood of their retention. I show that, between 1995 and 2014, justices appointed by the minority party who were eligible for a new term voted more in line with the preferences of their legislature than those who were no longer eligible for a new term due to mandatory or voluntary retirement. No similar effect is found among appointees of the majority party. To support my argument that it is the legislature's reappointment authority that gives them this power, I conduct a placebo test to show that governors in these states enjoy no comparable influence on reappointment-seeking justices. This legislative influence represents a substantial limitation on judicial independence.