This article analyzes the political afterlife of the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944-54 by relating the story of exiled political elites and their efforts to retake power in the decade following the CIA-sponsored coup of 1954. Through a thorough examination of the personal papers of Juan José Arévalo, the article argues that the demise of Guatemala's democratic left was not inevitable after 1954, but rather that the counterrevolutionary period (1954–63) was full of historical contingencies and possibilities. Factional tensions were rife among the exiled leftists, rooted especially in a debate over the culpability of Jacobo Arbenz and other radicals in the demise of the government, as well as disagreement over the proper relationship between the broader revolutionary movement and the communist Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT). This factionalism, as well as a failure to fully grasp from exile the extent to which Guatemala's political landscape had changed, ultimately rendered the movement unsuccessful in its bid to retake power. In 1963, a presidential campaign to restore Arévalo to power was ended by a military coup. The coup was a significant turning point in Guatemalan political history, after which there were few opportunities for the democratic left.