Chapter 4 exposes the growing contradiction in Israel’s engagement foreign policy stance, which, in certain respects, was advancing. By September 1995, Israel and the PLO had concluded the Oslo II interim agreement; Israel’s emerging ties with Arab countries in the Gulf and the Maghreb were continuing; and negotiations with Syria at an ambassadorial level and between the respective countries’ militaries’ chiefs of staff were maintained. At the same time, the domestic challenges to Israel’s policy of engagement intensified, prompting a flawed response from the Rabin government. Amid deteriorating security, Israel deployed coercive measures against the Palestinians, undermining the political standing of the Palestinian leadership, economy, and public support for negotiations with Israel. Nonetheless, terrorist attacks against Israelis continued, weakening the domestic legitimacy of engagement in Israel and fueling domestic opposition. Shifting the lens to Syria, the government attempted to sway domestic opposition to negotiations via public diplomacy with Syria’s obstinate and hostile President al-Assad, which backfired as al-Assad rejected all Israeli overtures. The chapter ends by uncovering how the failure to produce a breakthrough with Syria influenced Israel’s Iran policy, highlighting that Israel’s foreign policy of engagement remained vulnerable and incomplete.

Chapter 3 examines the evolution of Israel’s foreign policy of engagement under the Rabin government. It explains why the Israel-PLO and Israel-Syria peace processes remained contested, while Israel’s negotiations with Jordan yielded a peace accord. The chapter uncovers the deepening tension between the government pursing Israel’s policy of engagement and the domestic opposition it unleashed. It concludes that Israel’s foreign policy transition from entrenchment to engagement remained reversible. On the one hand, Israel concluded a peace agreement with Jordan, continued negotiations with the PLO and Syria, and engaged in budding negotiations with Arab countries in the Gulf and the Maghreb. On the other, however, nearing the brink of peace obscured a less visible, but highly significant fact, namely, that the Arab-Israeli peace process was enfeebled by domestic challenges. These included, for example, the deadly terrorist attacks launched by Hamas, hostile public opinion, and mounting political opposition in parliament on the grounds that engagement posed security risks to Israel and was anathema to its Jewish and Zionist identity of the state.